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CP ORGAN INTERVIEWS EDUCATION MINISTER ANAHITA RATEBZAD

Copenhagen LAND OG FOLK in Danish 20 Feb 80 p 7

[Interview with Anahita Ratebzad, education minister, by Palle Andersen -- date and place not given]

[Text] "Today we must face the fact that the 1978 April revolution was unable to carry out the ideal program submitted by our party, the Democratic People's Party (PDPA), shortly after the revolution," said Anahita Ratebzad, with a Ph.D. in medicine, education minister in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and member of PDPA's Politburo, in an interview with LAND OG FOLK.

"A census taken in April last year showed that Afghanistan's population was just over 15 million," continued Ratebzad. "It includes 20 nationalities that speak six different languages. However, 90 percent of the population is illiterate, not "just" 8 million, which we had anticipated. We had hoped, indeed believed, we might involve one million citizens in basic education courses during the first half of the revolution, but that was not possible.

We only reached half of that number, of which just three percent were city women. Village women did not sign up or were kept from doing so by their families. Of course, the period under despot and CIA-agent Amin put us further behind. We are now trying to develop a more realistic educational program, but that will take time, peace and tranquility, as well as tact and patience."

We Need Everything

The minister said she could "spare" the Danish guest an hour, but I felt ill at ease as I entered the minister's front office inside the ministry building. From the street up to the second floor I must have passed hundreds of citizens who patiently stood in line to talk to Anahita Ratebzad. They all had serious problems.

"Under the present circumstances," said Anahita after a friendly reception, "we have two basic responsibilities" a more intensive campaign against

illiteracy and the introduction of universal elementary education. We must be practical politicians. Each day we must take small, carefully measured steps in that direction because education is a national problem. Different organizations must become involved, youth, women, labor, the army, progressive religious leaders and, of course, the party and the mass media.

We must proceed tactfully, not issue decrees "from on high," but actually develop a "charm offensive," not least with respect to deeply religious persons, for how can you master the Koran and other religious writings if you cannot read or write?

But we must be extremely careful about interpreting the Koran," she continued. "Devout followers of the Islamic faith still believe the earth is as flat as a pancake, positively not round or even close to being round. I personally know two philology professors, who, in spite of their acquaintance with the world's literary classics, are still convinced that the earth is flat. For that reason we must proceed with utmost care.

We actually need everything, teaching materials, teachers and, of course, school buildings. We have developed a three-stage elementary program," said Anahita Ratebzad. "We will first establish grades 1, 2, 3 and 4, next grades 1 through 8 and then grades 1 through 10. Grades 1 through 4 will be a coeducational program. After that we must provide separate facilities since Afghan families are opposed to coeducation for older children.

We will also establish special schools for children 7 through 11 years of age and thus try to make up for lost time. During March and April this year we will host an international teachers' congress in Kabul. At the same time we will also conduct pedagogical conferences and seminars. New textbooks in the languages spoken in this republic are now under way. Outside help is absolutely necessary.

We receive a great deal of help from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and we are also appealing to progressive-minded people the world over for help. But in order to make the help effective, we suggest that progressive organizations send specialists to Afghanistan so that they, in concert with our ministry, can get a clear understanding of what we actually need.

Let us take Canada, for example; it wanted to establish a large printing center here. On 29 December, when the April revolution entered its second phase and when 75 percent of the revolutionary work had been completed, Canadians became "worried" by the hysterical and completely groundless frenzy which was engendered by our request for military aid from the Soviet Union to protect ourselves against foreign intervention.

Just to mention one detail," said Anahita Ratebzad, "the Afghan government and the Revolutionary Council had proclaimed Sunday 13 January as "the Day of the Martyrs" in memory of the more than ten thousand victims of the despotic Amin government. Ambassadors from NATO countries in Kabul held a

very "serious" conference all day Saturday. They discussed whether to raise their national flags, which ordinarily adorn the embassies. The flags were raised following the "serious discussion," but this shows their subservience to U.S. imperialism."

Women's Struggle

"It is true, as you remarked, that minor male children are involved in the street trade of all kinds of smuggled goods. That is really a problem," Anahita Ratebzad continued. "They have no real childhood; a 5 to 6-year old lad becomes acquainted with all the problems of bartering and dreams of becoming a "big" businessman. But talking to them and their families is just as difficult as getting girls and women involved in education. They cannot read newspapers and only a very few families have radio and television. Hence, we have loudspeakers in the street and recruiting brigades from various youth organizations.

Our party's youth organization consists only of young males; young women are organized in divisions that sort under the Democratic Women's League. Again, that is because we cannot argue with families, the Koran or Islamic teachings.

With only very few exceptions, no woman in Afghanistan has ever participated in social affairs. You talk to a woman, but you do not converse with a woman. She is mother, servant or slave, who humbly follows a man's directions since he is responsible for the material aspect of life.

Religion is not to be trifled with. According to Islamic teachings, we live in the year 1358 under feudalism and each bit of progress requires struggle. Just look at the number of veiled women in the streets, more than half of the women in Kabul and an overwhelming majority in the provinces. Or watch what happens on Friday (Moslem holiday). The proud father promenades with his sons; he would not dream of taking his daughter, or daughters along; they are left with the mother.

When I hear foreigners talk about social progress, equality, democracy etc., I always try to find out about the woman's standing in the country in question," said Anahita Ratebzad, "because without absolute equality, all these phrases are worthless. I am well acquainted with the different women's movements in the Western world, but most of them are on the wrong track; women's struggle is part of the class struggle. If we exploit the individual, the equality of women in society is just a phrase or, as in highly developed industrial nations, a formal "right" without substance."

Impatient Youth

"We are deeply indebted to the Soviet Union for its help and solidary support," said Anahita Ratebzad. "Its military aid prevented a bloody civil war and foreign intervention. U.S. imperialists and their lackeys are

furious, of course. Following "the loss" of Iran they gambled on the criminal Amin. Amin was supposed to provide the United States with a new deployment base against the Soviet Union. From the beginning of the 60's, Afghanistan has sent 250 students a year to the Soviet Union to obtain a higher education. These specialists became Amin's first victims, together with the leading members of PDPA and nonpartisan intellectuals.

All illegal comrades, including jailed comrades, did exceptional work under the grim conditions that characterized the Amin period. Keep in mind that all progressives, not just in Kabul but in the provinces too, were well known. People turned to them for everything, for help to read and write letters, explain the meaning of decrees and laws and go through newspapers with them.

The illegal comrade under Amin had to be adaptable and cautious every minute of the day. It was an enormous problem just to establish an illegal haunt. Amin and the entire gang of criminals have now been removed and we shall begin to solve a multitude of problems. Our youth is impatient. It wants to build a socialistic society with lightning speed in Afghanistan. That is understandable, but not realistic. I believe that given 10 years of peaceful, creative work in Afghanistan, we can say to ourselves and to our friends: We are now finally on the right road," said Anahita Ratebzad with a smile, discreetly letting me know that our conversation had come to an end. On my way down the stairs I passed several hundred persons patiently waiting to speak to "their" minister, who enjoys a completely overwhelming popularity in Afghanistan.

Afghanistans undervisningsminister Anahita Ratebzad

Afghanistan's Education Minister Anahita Ratebzad

8952
CSO: 3106

FIRST SOVIET PRESS REPORT ON SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE

Paris LE MONDE in French 12 Mar 80 p 8

[Article by correspondent Daniel Vernet--passages between slantlines published in italics]

[Text] Moscow--For the first time since a /"limited contingent of Soviet troops are temporarily within the territory of independent and sovereign Afghanistan at the request of its government,"/ the Moscow press published this Tuesday 11 March photographs of soldiers and military equipment. Under the title, /"Firm Friends,"/ RED STAR presented two pictures of /"fraternization"/ between Soviet soldiers and the local population. /"All good Afghans have welcomed the Soviet combatants with sincere hospitality and profound appreciation," the army paper said, quoting a Party official: /"Even those who at first naively believed the liears are more and more convinced that the Soviets came with good intentions."/

The Benevolence and Impartiality of the "Strong Men"

Certainly the Red Army came to Afghanistan to fight, but only against the bandits and counter-revolutionaries sent from overseas by the American and Chinese special services, with the support of Pakistan. Officially, in fact, the troops of the USSR are not involved in operations in the interior of the country; their mission is simply to protect the borders. But the image that the Soviet press wants to convey of the army to its readers is not that of warlike troops.

If one believes the various reports, Soviet soldiers are playing more the role of social assistants. They organize emergency medical assistance in ruined towns, repair the bridges, build houses, restore agricultural equipment, help in the work in the fields; re-paint the boarding houses for the war orphans of the country and set up /"halls of Soviet-Afghan friendship"/ in the factories. /"The wireless telephone transmits from village to village the good word about Soviet soldiers,"/ says a peasant quoted by IZVESTIA. /"When a brother comes to see his brother, it is to help him, make his life easier, help him in his work and his struggle."/

This idyllic tableau is only marred by bandits and counter-revolutionaries who are infiltrated into Afghanistan. For, not content merely to be grateful for the /"pacific actions"/ of the Soviet soldiers, the Afghans also admire their intrinsic qualities. These combatants show impartiality, benevolence, the simplicity of /"strong men"/. as for immemorial centuries those who have weapons and thus strength and power have been called, continues the newspaper of the Soviet government. A Kabul educator goes even further: /"Afghans understand the essential very well: an inner penchant toward benevolence, to disinterested assistant, an internationalism elevated by the socialist regime which is proper to the Soviet soul."/ IZVESTIA also quotes a /"peasant"/: the Soviet soldiers are /"almost as modest as our daughters, but they are true fighters: courageous, strong, conscientious, men who protect the weak, feed the hungry, bring warmth to the cold."/

Mr. Fidel Castro, for the first time since the entry of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, has taken a clear position. Speaking to the Third Congress of Cuban Women on Monday 10 March, in Havana, he said: /"American imperialism continues to practice a provocative policy on Afghanistan, which was seriously threatened by foreign intervention. It is only thanks to the help of the USSR that the plans of imperialism have been foiled. The events of Afghanistna, caused directly by the interference of imperialist forces, were used by the United States to aggravate to the maximum the international climate, in order to augment the Pentagon's budget."/ This passage, which was not reproduced by the official agency, Prensa Latina, in its French dispatches, was published by Tass and by L'HUMANITE.

9516
CSO: 4900

DIFFICULT COOPERATION BETWEEN PARIS, KABUL

Paris LE MONDE in French 12 Mar 80 p 8

[Article by Patrick Frances--passages between slantlines published in italics]

[Text] New Delhi--The arrival at the New Delhi airport Friday 7 March of eight French children from Kabul marked a turning point in French authorities' appreciation of the situation in Afghanistan. Whereas the United States, Great Britain, and the Federal Republic of Germany have already repatriated the majority of those under their jurisdiction, France, along with its partners in theEEC, had simply recalled its ambassador for consultations. The latter is still in Paris, where his wife has joined him.

Considered by some resident as /"rather optimistic"/, French authorities nonetheless as early as last autumn offered to those who wished it a partial removal of their effects, and the majority of residents accepted. Since then, and apparently in light of the events of 21 and 22 February, the parents of children remaining in Kabul were strongly encouraged to repatriate their offspring. Today, all the French children and the majority of mothers have departed the Afghan capital.

As for the instructors paid by France who teach in the Esteqlal Franco-Afghan school and the Malalal girls' school, they are presently living on hope. A dozen, who were on vacation in France, were begged by the Quai d' Orsay to stay there until 15 March. As for those others, also 12 in number, who found themselves in India or Afghanistan, most of them have returned to Kabul, with the schools set to re-open on 21 March.

The situation is at the very least difficult for the French cultural services, since their main objective, it seems, is to pursue cooperation, without for all that appearing to endorse the regime in place. The example of the Esteqlal school illustrates the difficulty of the task. Near to the old royal palace (today the House of the People), this school in reality occupies a strategic position. Since the April revolution, it has been sheltering a cache of arms, and every night it was occupied by militia, which obviously created problems for the French teaching corps.

/"In fact,"/ one teacher says, /"every time there is serious shooting, the school is transformed into a barracks."/

Since December, when the school holidays commenced, the entrance hall of the school has been permanently occupied by some twenty armed militiamen. A French tourist, arrested recently in Kabul, was detained there and interrogated by Parchamis (militia of the party in power), in the office of the deputy director. Later, he was expelled.

Concerned above all to maintain a French presence, the services in the embassy proposed to Paris that only volunteer teachers be used at the Esteqlal school. Are there many at present? /"You can count them on the fingers of one hand,"/ according to one resident, /"but the primary objective would be met."/

Besides the secondary teaching mission and the embassy personnel (some 20 people), others stationed in Kabul include two professors employed by the French department of the university, two members of CNRS [National Center for Scientific Research], a doctor, three officials of the Franco-Afghan Pedagogic Center (the cultural center), and the five members of the archaeological mission (DAFA) [expansion unknown].

The attitude of the Afghan authorities is characterized by a clearly favorable predisposition, as the French presence could be taken for a sign of the legitimacy of the regime in place. Moreover, the position adopted by Marchais after the Soviet intervention and the recent visit to Kabul by a delegation of the CGT [General Confederation of Labor] (identified at the time by the local press as the PCF syndicate) explain why at the official level France must be held in high regard,--or more precisely, French Communists.

9516
CSO: 4900

INSURGENT LEADERS PROFILED BY NORWEGIAN PAPER

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 2 Apr 80 p 4

[Article by Ulf Andenaes]

[Text] Who are the men leading the Afghan resistance against the Red Army? In contrast to many other liberation movements the Afghan guerrillas have not yet produced a corps of leaders. At the head of this popular revolt in the literal sense are not one but thousands of leaders of various types: tribal chiefs, village leaders, mullahs, deserted officers and others who have gone into action in various places.

Part of the reason for this division is that Afghanistan has never been a real national state but has more closely resembled a loose federation of tribes and local communities whose subordination to the government in Kabul has at times been just a formality. But there is another unpleasant reason for the lack of known leaders. During the bloody uprisings of recent years most of the old political elite in the country have been more or less wiped out. The surviving person who under different conditions might have emerged as a unifying force, the exiled king Zahir Shah, is a controversial figure in the resistance movement and is standing in the wings in almost total silence in his residence in Rome.

The best-known resistance leaders are the ones who have settled in exile in Peshawar, the border town just across the Pakistani border near the Khyber Pass. The most prominent among them is 48-year-old aristocrat Sayed Ahmad Gailani, leader of the National Islamic Front. Gailani comes from one of the most respected families in Afghanistan and according to tradition he is descended from Mohammed himself. Both his father and his great-grandfather were religious leaders of great renown and his father also served as adviser for many years to Amanullah, one of the former kings of the country. He himself is reported to be a very rich man.

Viewed with western eyes Gailani is the resistance leader most closely resembling a moderate reform politician. At times he calls himself a

Social Democrat--which should be taken with a grain of salt--and he would like a democratic form of government and modernization of his country, although on an Islamic basis. He was adviser to the now deceased President Noor Mohammed Taraki just after he took power exactly 2 years ago. It soon became apparent that Taraki was leading the country in the direction of communism and Gailani fell out with the regime. He was threatened with liquidation and fled to Pakistan in October 1978 to organize the resistance struggle.

Gailani has the support of a wide variety of people. Many middle-class Afghan refugees and those remaining from the country's ruling class have joined forces under his banner, including surviving government officials and diplomats. Due to his background and ancestry he also has the support of many religious leaders. A major power base for him lies in Paktia, an extremely unruly tribal province on the border with Pakistan where so far guerrillas have been able to operate without much interference from Kabul. His influence there is based on family and tribal connections and several of his close relatives are organizing the struggle in the region. On this point Gailani is more advanced than most of the other exiled leaders who usually send their people across the border with money which is used to obtain the support of guerrilla bands.

It is said that Gailani has contacts with the royal family in Saudi Arabia and with ex-king Zahir. His movement gets some economic support from the oil states in the Persian Gulf.

Aside from Gailani 34-year-old Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is one of the most important of the exiled leaders. He is an engineer by profession, educated at the Technical College of Kabul and a staunch Moslem of the most orthodox caliber. For this reason and because of his hostility to the country's ex-monarch he is often referred to as an "Afghan Khomeyni." He is a founder of the movement "Hezbe Islami," which in a direct translation means the Islamic Party. He was jailed under the monarchy and it is primarily resistance on his part that has made it difficult to use the king as a unifying figure.

Hekmatyar's exile movement in Peshawar seems well-organized but also somewhat extremist and under student influence. According to his program Afghanistan should be purged of foreign influences as much as possible, women should remain veiled and voting would be reserved for "men generally respected by their fellow citizens who are of the proper faith." Rival Gailani accuses Hekmatyar of wanting to take the country "back to the Dark Ages." Foreigners who have met him describe him as a strong and upright person and his young followers treat him like a guru.

It is not easy to place Hekmatyar politically according to western concepts. He is an ardent anticommunist and one of his most important

charges against the monarchy was that the king allowed too many Russians and communists into the country. He was forced to leave Afghanistan before the communists took control after he killed a leftist student in a street clash in Kabul. He regards the Islamic revolution in Iran as a political model.

The other resistance leaders in exile are a mixed bunch. Prominent among them is the learned Moslem professor, Burhaniddin Rabanni, who leads a kind of joint council which the various guerrilla movements have set up in exile. In addition he leads his own movement, Jamiat-e-islami, which is orthodox in religion and conservative in politics. Another leader is Zia Khan Nassry at the head of the Islamic Nationalist Party who is regarded as a good public relations man but something of an opportunist. Mohammed Nabi Mohammed, leader of the Islamic Revolutionary Council, makes an almost Old Testament impression. There are a number of other leaders as well.

A common characteristic for most of the resistance leaders in exile is that it is very uncertain how many people inside the borders of Afghanistan they can really speak for. Most of the guerrilla fighters and resistance people fight the Russians and communism without paying too much attention to the various trends in the emigrant camp. If a unifying Afghan resistance leader should emerge it is very possible that he will not come from the ranks of the emigrants at all. On the contrary he will probably be found living among his tribal warriors, constantly on the warpath in the Afghan mountains, a man as yet unknown to the outside world.

6578
CSO: 3108

CHANGES UNDER CHADLI EXAMINED

Paris DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE in French 10 Mar 80 pp 22-24

[Article by Bachir Rezzoug: "What Has Changed With Chadli"]

[Text] The event that has disrupted Algerian political life for a year remains very much the following: the reactivation of the institutions, the FLN Central Committee and the National Assembly. All the most hotly debated issues--hydrocarbons, the first 5-year plan[1]--all decisions henceforth are to go through the two assemblies, which, at the same time, have again taken up democratic methods, which under the prompting of the Algerian chief of state, Chadli Bendjedid, have not been long in coming.

Inducted into office in February of last year, he formed his first government less than a month later, on 8 March 1979. The first meeting of the Central Committee was held, in accordance with the political calendar, as early as the month of April. The National Assembly itself was at all the meetings also. The political apparatus thus revived would be confronted, week after week, with new data which would serve as the main course for a political leadership determined, before all, to control events rather than submit to them.

Chadli was thus able, in a year, to take advantage of a current of nearly general approval to get some ideas "accepted." But, at the same time, he proposed a series of "breaks." A break with misleading words, it was soon realized, in order to face realities courageously. Even the most embarrassing ones apparently could not disarm him: "Difficulties exist, and we are not ashamed of recognizing this." At the very first meeting of the Central Committee, the Algerian president set the tone. This veritable obsession with a "break" with past methods would be clearly felt.

Chadli wanted particularly to make up for lost time. He was moreover to state during that same meeting: "The time assigned to the assessment operation was insufficient...." A race against the clock? The impatience of a man who wished to tackle problems one by one and, above all, to diagnose precisely a situation before proposing remedies? There is no doubt that, since his taking office, he wanted to be sure of the meaning

to be given to his policies. "An atmosphere of openness," "a spirit of responsibility," "a political conscience," "a democratic spirit": his statement reveals that he wanted to make sure of the possibilities of action and very quickly to prepare alternative policies. The manner in which the Algerian president stayed the threats that hung over the country at the time he succeeded Boumediene and in which, better still, he convinced everyone that the aim had to be corrected in some places earns him unquestionable consideration today.

Modified positions, indeed, but rectifications that are not complete about-turns. He did not fail to insist on this essential point. "The problem of options is not presented at all." As we know, the man is not of a hesitant nature. The clear positions he has taken, his brief, clear-cut interventions, his clear decisions attest to the fact that Chadli Bendjedid indeed expects to secure new successes. Whence his tranquil attitude. The only question is to know today whether such "conquests" can be lasting and whether the political rallying around him can always be as coherent.

Taking pains to express his judgments clearly and firmly, which justified thinking that there would be an end to underground battles--at least that was his wish--he was able to avoid both gropings and misunderstandings. However, there was no extravagant personalization of power. This takes on unquestionable political importance. Problems in abeyance, added to personal quarrels, could make us fear the worst. But the worst has been a long time coming. All through the year, Algeria has shown that it could overcome its own difficulties.

The feeling that it would begin by the essentials was apparent since the formation of this first government: a precise study of the positive results noted, of the deficiencies that would have been localized and, at the same time, of the necessary correctives for stabilizing an economic and social situation here and there delicate. The national interest? Who does not talk about it? A magic formula for handing on good old recipes, it would here taken an entirely different turn. We will quickly come to the heart of the matter.

Scarcely was the political setting in place than the new ministers were already at their files, obviously proving that the political apparatus was strong from "within," that it insisted on advancing in close order. Chadli occupied himself with maintaining cohesion. Events themselves were also manageable. Some rear-guard combats? There were some. But both the Central Committee and the National Assembly had to make short work of them. In all serenity. And it was on specific cases where some cleavages appeared between different trends, more "technical" than political, in conflict on questions as vital to the country as hydrocarbons[2] or even agriculture, that democracy would be able to sink its first roots.

Since then, the taking in hand of the economic and social sectors and the new priorities taking shape are arousing a new climate of confidence. It

is not yet enthusiasm. But it is no longer gloominess. And the "normalization" of relations between the various components of power is not the least result of President Chadli's policies. After 18 years of independence, we can think and admit that the "pioneer" era is gone by. Yesterday it was necessary, above all, to build, today it is necessary, basically, to manage. The argument that states that bad results are a necessary evil in view of the colossal undertaking of reconstruction can no longer serve. "The problems from which we suffer are the result of rapid development," President Chadli acknowledges, however.

Plainly, the moment has come to set things to rights. The machine had raced a little and, intoxicated, the "managers," trained in different schools, were complicating an already quite embarrassing situation. By multiplying...solutions! At the risk of great confusion. The "behavior" and the "doings" of some managerial staff, in Chadli's own terms, would, moreover, be evoked at length during the first meeting of the Central Committee, a decisive meeting which set the country on the path of healthy confrontation. Addressing himself to the Central Committee, Chadli was again to say on this ticklish subject: "The political leadership has stated its position with regard to this question." He then added: "Things are even clearer with the control machinery beginning to function," before inviting the institutions "to assume all their responsibilities," specifying, in particular, the National Assembly and the Audit Office.

Responsibility, dialog, consultation: these words punctuate a statement published in its entirety by the national information organ EL MOUDJAHID. One could not more clearly admit that the country was changing with Chadli, that the government has changed methods. The danger of seeing Algeria flounder in improvisation, even after its innumerable successes, is henceforth averted. The risk of killing off even the prospective reflex in the decision centers themselves was equally as great in a country which, in addition, was not yet able to regulate either the thorny demographic question or that of population movements. The movement of the peasants, who never stop "going down" to the plains, where housing, water, work, hospitals and schools remain available and affordable. The risk also of seeing a few overworked civil servants throw together plans for restarting undertakings which they have obviously not thought about sufficiently.

1978-1979: the pause. No one wanted to look further than the immediate horizon. Thus, the two 4-year plans having been only partially carried out, the year 1979 was declared a "year of adjustment." It seems very clear today that all the decisions of the new political leadership fit very logically within the long-term strategy. How can we explain this great effort? Basically, there was first of all a political will: that of avoiding flights forward or self-satisfaction. And this was to undergo the test of deeds in the weeks to follow the putting in place of the country's political institutions.

That is precisely what brings out the role played in turn by the Central Committee, which would have to come to a decision on the country's basic problems, and by the National Assembly, which, on several occasions, would not fail to manifest its political presence. It is clear that the political leadership wished to establish, with the Central Committee's assistance, that indispensable economic counter-valuation center which Algeria was deprived of for many years. It was no longer a question of leaving the field free to the "builders." The Central Committee would have diagnosis as its principal task. At the same time, it would act as a spur. To the questions asked of its members, replies were not long in coming. If unanimity was achieved right away around new priorities: housing, health, hydraulics, so urgent these appeared, the debates were close, often difficult, when the serious question of the redeployment of oil operations was raised.[2]

The facts confirm that Chadli, in setting in motion the various economic indicators put in place, had henceforth a very firm idea on all these questions. Thus he did not have any need to back up his threats. Reassuring, temperate, a man of dialogue, he was able, when necessary, to show himself intransigent as well. Two events amply confirm this: the departure in October of the minister of hydraulics, who, wishing to submit an oil plan considered too bold and inconsistent, "upset" the rules of the game; and later the warning addressed to the "Arabizing" students, who had blithely crossed the threshhold which separates outbursts of temper from political maneuvers.

In fact, the political leadership could no longer act on the basis of arguments adapted to outmoded situations. The question of the institutions and of the democratization of politics having been asked and to a great extent resolved, it was certainly necessary to pursue a bold investment policy, but at the same time to correct the aim and to give a new start to the neglected sectors. Agriculture and self-sufficiency in food appear to be the most important of all preoccupations.[3] A long-term program to restructure the whole of the agricultural sector and its environment is beginning to be implemented. It always gives rise to the same thought: the problem is not only one of giving the Algerians work--curiously, the land of Algeria lacks manpower--but of assuring them of greater equality.

Several requirements come to light. If there is no shadow hovering over an agrarian revolution started 8 years ago, and if the work undertaken is sanctified as "a basic tool for the building of socialism," it is asked today that it be "the subject of a precise evaluation in order to make the agricultural sector a strategic base for development." A change of course or a simple reordering there also? To be sure, if redeployment becomes necessary, it still needs clarification nonetheless: self-management, cooperatives, state property, the private sector, all this is a lot and introduces some confusion. Of an ideological nature? We must look more clearly into that.

Today, in a profusion of formulas and techniques, which in the end appeared to be serious cleavages, a consensus has been outlined. For it to take final form, fundamental questions must be resolved. Chadli had the ability to ask them correctly. What was needed was imagination, courage, a spirit of consultation and wide popular support. Exactly what was necessary for a country which has not yet ceased to be surprising...

FOOTNOTES

1. The first Algerian 5-year plan (1980-1984) may be submitted to the National Assembly in June 1980. It takes over the programs not completed in preceding plans. Future investment effort aims essentially at the improvement of living conditions through the growth of social facilities and consumer goods.

2. With regard to hydrocarbons, which ensure the country of essential currency resources, the "reserve strategy" is adhered to. It was recognized that the program for natural gas development necessitated an increase in the foreign debt. The debate, which set two members of the government against each other on this precise question, was cut short. Algeria thus avoided the risk of polarizing the economy on export of a structural character to the detriment of the other sectors.

3. The reordering of the agricultural sector itself is hinged around several axes: more autonomy to farming concerns, which have suffered greatly from a bureaucratic environment; a possible breaking up of large farms into several farms for production; continuous, effective, and, above all, decentralized support to farms; development of rural housing to solve the problem of the fellahs' unsettled pattern of life; lastly, considerable funds allocated to the private sector.

9434
CSO: 4400

YEAR'S RESULTS OF KHOMEYNI RULE REVIEWED

Paris LE FIGARO in French 16 Feb 80 pp 31-34

[Article by Albert Zarca]

[Text] Initially planned for the shah, the apartment is spacious and comfortable: a bedroom, a living room, an office and two rooms for aides de camp. Ayatollah Khomeyni will reside from now on at Rezai Hospital in Tehran, one of the most renowned cardiology centers in the world.

According to the doctors, the worst was avoided from the night when the master of Iran was rushed to the hospital, overwhelmed by an attack of angina pectoris. Doctor Rivier has returned to Lausanne and only the Iranian doctors Moareffi and Massoumi, two world-famous cardiologists, are watching over the famous patient. Dr Massoumi is particularly happy over having helped save Khomeyni. For professional reasons, of course, but also because he has thus been able to justly get even with the guardians of the revolution. Arrested in the street a few months ago by some of them, he publicly received 10 lashes with a whip. The reason: the alcohol test which he had undergone--in this case, the nose of their leader stuck in his mouth--had revealed the stench of alcohol.

But although Ayatollah Khomeyni has been out of the intensive care unit for 2 weeks, he continues to cause his associates great anxiety, particularly his son Ahmad, the so-called "crown prince." He has lost his drive; he becomes exhausted very quickly, to the point that he can move about only in a wheelchair, and the interest that he formerly showed in governing seems to be waning. "The imam is becoming more and more detached from his surroundings," a government dignitary remarked a few days ago. Keenly aware of this sudden and persistent fatigue, his doctors have forbidden him to return to Qom.

But the Ayatollah's health is not the only concern of Iranians. Iran is crumbling economically and is on dangerous ground politically, despite the staggering results achieved by Abolhassan Bani Sadr, the new president of the republic. There is so much apprehension among officials that capital is again beginning to flow out of Iran. According to well-informed sources, Ahmad Khomeyni himself has recently purchased an apartment on Avenue de Versailles in Paris, residences on the French riviera have been acquired by

other Iranian figures and a large number of paintings by old masters and very valuable "knickknacks," removed from national palaces on behalf of a government dignitary, have left Iran for the United States.

"In 1977-1978," Houchang Nahavandi, former minister of development and an economist, told me, "Iran produced a million metric tons of rice, which made it possible to meet 80 percent of the country's needs. Today, all rice consumed in Iran is entirely imported. Imports of food products, which were $3 billion in 1977-1978, have risen to $8 billion in 1979. Inflation is more than 100 percent annually."

The price of meat has tripled in 1 year. Until the hostages were taken, chickens and eggs were imported to Iran by El Al planes despite Khomeyni's anti-Zionist position. But since the hostages were taken, Jerusalem has terminated these deliveries and shortages are beginning to be sorely felt.

Officially, Islamic courts have sentenced 1,000 persons to death and had them executed, including 140 generals and high-ranking officers. In reality, more than 40,000 persons have been killed since the establishment of the Khomeyni government, including Kurdistan and other Iranian provinces. "The Organization of the Iranian Liberation Army" states in its newspaper ARA that 2,700 officers from all ranks and noncommissioned officers have been executed. Prisons are bursting with political prisoners, to such an extent that an interior minister officially stated one day: "Iranians must provide for their safety by their own means, because the government cannot see to this for the time being. It does not have room to confine common law criminals."

Military Revolt

Under the imperial "old regime," Mr Lahidji, general secretary of the Association for the Protection of Human Rights in Iran, was beaten by Savac agents for having publicly denounced the violation of human rights. A month and a half ago, Mr Lahidji wanted to relaunch the same operation. He tried again to alert public opinion. He was taken away in broad daylight and "flogged" by unknown persons whose identity he quickly discovered: they belonged to Savama, the political police which has succeeded Savac. The International Red Cross was authorized to freely visit prisons beginning in 1975. The shah had made that decision because of the pressure of international opinion. The Red Cross recently made several approaches to the governments of Ayatollah Khomeyni, without success. No visit has thus far been authorized.

In view of the deteriorating situation, all factions are organizing.

Within the ayatollah's circle of associates itself, they are preparing for the future. There are the diehards clinging to power, of course, but there are others who are thinking of tomorrow. One mullah, a member of the Revolutionary Council, has just made a short visit to Europe. He met with various members of the Iranian opposition and told them that with $20 to 30 million, it would be easy to organize popular "spontaneous" demonstrations against

the current government. "It does not have long to go," he predicted. "It is eroded internally and will end in a military coup d'etat or in a communist dictatorship."

The opposition is preparing for the battle. Mr Bakhtiar has just returned from a trip to Iraq. There he was reportedly assured that the movement which he is organizing will be supported. He has even built a military organization and has set up a staff composed of two generals. Paralleling this, another larger military organization set up by General Oveissi, former army chief of staff under the shah, will allegedly carry out large-scale operations in coming weeks. Supported by the Americans, Oveissi has made several visits to Europe and has just left for the Iranian border. Of the 1,500 officers who have taken refuge in the United States, 900 have sided with him. The others prefer to wait. The 500 officers currently living in Europe have also joined Oveissi. They are now under the command of a lieutenant general who, of course, wishes to remain anonymous for the time being. About 100 officers who have taken refuge in Israel, Egypt, Iraq and Kurdistan, where they are training Kurdish montagnards, have told him that they are also at his disposal.

Then there are the troops, who are located in Iran itself. About four divisions, 100,000 Iranian army soldiers, are ready to march with Oveissi.

Faced with these dangers of military revolt, what can the Khomeyni government do? Militarily, not much. Of 1,000 Iranian air force planes, only 20 are in flying condition due to lack of maintenance, pilots and spare parts. Of 1,000 helicopters, about 20 are in working condition. As for tanks, there are only about 30 in operation.

With regard to Bani Sadr, he undeniably has the support of Ayatollah Khomeyni. Himself the son of a hodjatoleslam--a dignitary of the Shiite clergy--from Hamadan and a theology graduate, he has always held the imam's interest. It was at his residence in Cachan that the latter stayed before occupying his villa in Neauphle-le-Chateau with its 24 telephone lines. But he enjoys no support among Khomeyni's associates. Sadeq Ghotbzadeh, minister of foreign affairs and former director of radio and television, fiercely hates him, as do the guardians of the revolution and the Islamic militia. Oddly, the Americans support him and he also blamed for being France's man.

For the time being, Bani Sadr has achieved three victories: being elected president, seizing Iranian radio and television in the name of the people and freeing the minister of information, incarcerated in Evin prison by the "students" of the U.S. Embassy.

A Legal Coup d'Etat

The new president, formerly minister of finance and economy, is responding blow by blow economically. He has announced a reduction of Tehran's population, a method already used in Cambodia. And he has made innovations in international relations by "nationalizing foreign indebtedness," which means quite simply that Iran will no longer pay its foreign debts.

After these appropriate measures to strengthen his public image among the "little people who have elected me," Bani Sadr will have to decide: either to leave things as they are, which means governing without governing in the shadow of a very weakened Khomeyni, or to execute a "legal coup d'etat" to assure his own presidency. In the latter case, he would have no choice except to rely on the navy, which so far has expressed no support for the Islamic government and whose chief, Admiral Madani, even received 20 percent of the votes.

"Everything will be decided within 2 to 3 weeks," an Iranian figure passing through Paris predicted. "Between now and then, Bani Sadr will have decided his fate. I do not see it as very rosy. The troubles of post-Khomeyni Iran are not over ..."

11915
CSO: 4900

KHOMEYNI CONDEMNS SOVIET AS WELL AS U.S. IMPERIALISM

Paris LE MONDE in French 23-24 Mar 80 pp 1,3

[Article by Eric Rouleau: "For the Imam Khomeyni, 'International Communism' is as Dangerous as 'American Imperialism'"]

[Text] In his "message to the nation," on the occasion of the Iranian new year, the Imam Khomeyni on Friday, 21 March, for the first time since his return to Iran, denounced "international communism" which he considers as dangerous to his country as "American imperialism." Silently passing over the conflict with Washington on the subject of the extradition of the Shah and the hostages, he then almost exclusively went after the USSR, condemning the "brutal occupation" of Afghanistan by the "looters from the East." In Panama, AFP [French Press Agency] learned that the Iranian government will, on Monday, officially demand the extradition of the Shah of Iran. According to CBS, an American television network, White House secretary-general Hamilton Jordan went to Panama on Friday to try to unravel the situation resulting from the report on the surgical operation for the former Shah. The American surgeons as a matter of fact supposedly refused to operate in a Panamanian hospital and insisted that the patient be transferred to an American hospital in the Canal Zone or in the United States. The Panamanian authorities supposedly indicated that, in that case, they would oppose the return of the Shah to Panama.

Tehran--The Iranian right, conservatives of all kinds, the integrist clergy, the partisans of the monarchy can rejoice over the latest statements by the Imam Khomeyni. The "guide of the revolution" on Tuesday, 18 March, began by amnestying the collaborators of the old regime, with the exception of those who were guilty of torture, murder,

or embezzlement of funds. The significance of this measure could be quite considerable; while the number of adversaries of the Shah, arrested after the revolution on charges of having challenged the new Islamic system, remain in jail, hundreds of royalists were to be released shortly. Better still, thousands of former SAVAK /Intelligence and Security Organization/ agents--44,000, we were told by President Bani Sadr--have thus been rehabilitated and could be reintegrated into the republican administration. Anybody who opposes this measure of grace would be hauled before the Islamic tribunals, the Imam threatened.

In a second address on Thursday, 20 March, the "guide of the revolution" without waiting for the inquiry launched on the multitude of election fraud cases reported, proclaimed that the voting, with a few exceptions, took place in an equitable manner and amid "total calm." He thus in advance gave his support to the elected representatives of the Islamic Republican Party who will probably hold a majority of seats, even though some of them reportedly got the benefit of irregularities and pressures exerted by the mullahs.

The Imam had nothing to say about the bloody clashes in the various cities and towns of Kurdistan, as well as the acts of aggression committed against the candidates and members of left-wing parties, especially the mudjahedin of the people (progressive Muslims).

In a third "message to the nation" which was read by his son, Mr Ahmad Khomeyni on 21 March, the Imam in 13 points presented the policy which the government and the president of the republic were to implement during the new Persian year: strikes will be forbidden and strikers will be judged as "counter-revolutionary" troublemakers; henceforth, seizures of land, movable or immovable property belonging to the "oppressors" (the privileged individuals under the old regime) would be carried out only on orders from the attorney general or from "competent judges"; higher education would be Islamized, professors displaying "sympathies for the East or West" would be placed on leave. Most of the partisans of the old regime have already been removed from the academies and universities so that it will be above all the left-wing, Marxist or non-Marxist teachers who will run the risk of becoming the victims of this new witch hunt.

Imam Khomeyni is not satisfied with the press either; in recent months, the press has gained a certain degree of autonomy and freedom of expression which it uses with discernment, by the way. "The journalists," he said, "must not profit from their freedom in order to plot. I have found unfortunately that some of them tried to impose ideologies imported from the West or the East." This sort of thing is to stop, along with any malicious criticisms and insinuations toward the clergy, something which "practically has become the current vogue." Once again the role played by the lay parties and organizations in the resistance to the

imperial regime, the Imam, without distinction, credited all of the mullahs with having "led the people to victory."

While appealing for unity between the clergy and the intellectuals, the Imam addressed his bitter reproaches to the latter. Obviously talking about the mudjahedin of the people, he declared: "Islam is a school rich in teachings which must not be corrupted by Marxist concepts." By a strange turnabout, the "guide of the revolution" thus seems to have adopted as his own the accusation which the Shah made in the past against the mudjahedin whom he called "Islamo-Marxists."

"Vigorously Repress" Breaches of Discipline

Claiming his "divine responsibility," the founder of the Islamic Republic then decreed that the Persian new year would be a year of "restoration of order and security." He called upon the population to fight against the armed partisan groups (undoubtedly the fedayin and other extreme left-wing organizations) who, according to him, if they had seized power, would not have failed to establish a "dictatorship" and to "gag the people."

The Imam ordered the president of the Republic "vigorously to repress" any active insubordination, breach of discipline, or negligence within the government administration, the armed forces, the guardians of the revolution (government militia forces), the police, and the gendarmerie. Any manifestation of challenge or disobedience, passive or active, he added, should be punished "severely." The revolutionary tribunals must inflict "divine punishments" (sic).

In a preamble to his "thirteen commandments," the Imam somehow justifies the repressive policy which he preaches by mentioning the threats against Iran from the "superpowers." This passage undoubtedly is the most remarkable in his statement. For the first time, the Imam is not referring to the United States as the "big satan" or the "principal enemy" of Iran. "Dear friends," he declared in particular, "you must realize that the danger threatening us from the communist powers is no less than those from the United States." And he noted in particular: "we are fighting against international communism with the same determination as against Western imperialism, against Zionism, and against Israel." This, if we are not mistaken" is the first time that the Imam denounced "international communism."

"The Brutal Occupation of Afghanistan"

It was undoubtedly not by chance that the Imam, in his three statements over these past several days, did not make any reference to the Iranian-American conflict on the subject of the extradition of the

Shah or the hostages held in Tehran. The silence he maintained on the subject of the "Islamic students" who are holding the American diplomats, could also be significant.

The guide of the revolution exclusively went after the USSR. He condemned the "brutal occupation of Afghanistan" by the "looters from the East" and he expressed the wish "that the Muslim people of Afghanistan might regain its independence and extricate itself from the clutches of those who present themselves as the defenders of the working class.

One can better judge the evolution in the Imam's attitude by recalling that he waited more than a month before he criticized the Afghanistan invasion, in relatively moderate terms. Apparently following his example, the "Islamic students" and a number of leaders, especially members of the clergy, maintained that he did not want "Soviet aggression" to serve as a "pretext" for a weakening in the struggle of the Iranian people against American imperialism. The "guide of the revolution" seemed to have adopted the viewpoint of president Bani Sadr according to whom Iran's independence could be defended only by fighting the battle "on both fronts," lumping the USSR and the United States together.

Consolidating the New Institutions

In his speech on Friday, on the occasion of Now-rouz (the Persian new year), Mr Bani Sadr at length covered the Afghan affair and revealed that he had sent a message to the Soviet government in which he called upon it "immediately and unconditionally to withdraw" its troops regardless of whether or not there is any American interference in Afghanistan. And he further revealed that he rejected a Moscow offer to start talks on this subject, since such a dialog in his opinion is "useless."

It is undoubtedly too early to speak of a turnabout in Iran's domestic and foreign policy, especially since one cannot rule out new changes in direction. But one can nevertheless reveal that, in Imam Khomeyni and especially in President Sadr, the desire to mute anti-American agitation, which is considered sterile, and to concentrate on the task of consolidating the new institutions of the Republic, while pushing the left-wing forces out of power and laying the foundations for an economy that would be "independent both of the West and the East." However, the road charted so far appears to be entirely too much dotted with ambushes to enable us to anticipate any stabilization within the foreseeable future.

5058
CSO: 4900

MULLAHS GUIDE ISLAMIC ELECTIONS

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 24 Mar 80 pp 136-140

[Article: "Iran--'We Are Like Someone Drowning'"]

[Text] The first parliamentary elections in the ayatollah's Islamic Republic were won by the mullahs--possibly through manipulation. Because the case of the hostages constitutes a burden for the country, President Bani-Sadr would like to settle it as quickly as possible, but his political base has become even narrower since the elections. Meanwhile there is increasing restiveness in the United States.

The ayatollah called, and his people did not disappoint him. "Smash the hopes of the enemies of the Islamic Republic, rush to the polls" was what the Shiite leader demanded of the Iranians--and they duly came and voted for their master's turban-wearing apologists.

Thus it became apparent toward the end of last week that at the first parliamentary elections of the Khomeyni era the radical Shiites of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) probably had won the greatest number of seats obtained by direct election.

With dismay it was noted in Washington that, of all things, Iran's militants, who all along had made the release of the 50 hostages at the American Embassy dependent on the handing over of the shah and his wealth, presumably would have a majority in the Majles, the Iranian parliament.

And according to the wish of the ayatollah, whose word continues to be law in Iran, the 270 deputies are to decide about whether and when the imprisonment of the 50 Americans, now in its 5th month, is to end. No one, however, dares predict just when the parliament, once it is ready to conduct business, will discuss the hostage question.

While in the Indian Ocean an armada of 31 U.S. warships, including landing craft, is waiting for orders to go into action, in the United States

the number is growing of those whose patience with the imponderables of Islamic Iran has been exhausted.

Firebrands like Senator from California Hayakawa, who called on President Carter to put all Iranians living in the United States into concentration camps and at long last to start a blockade or at least an economic boycott, are now drawing more attention than they did only a couple of weeks ago.

Then it seemed for a short time as if a UN commission of five jurists might manage the transfer of the hostages at least from the hands of the militant students to the control of the Revolutionary Council. But upon a word from Khomeyni everything remained as it was, and the commission departed without having gotten anywhere--mission not accomplished. "A High Noon atmosphere prevails there," moaned one of the UN people.

President Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr and Foreign Minister Gotbzadeh "really tried to find a solution," acknowledged one of Jimmy Carter's advisers, "but unfortunately were unable to accomplish anything."

After the parliamentary elections they will be even less able to achieve anything. "There are two kinds of hostages in Iran, "the U.S. news magazine TIME commented--"the 50 Americans and the government of President Bani-Sadr."

In fact Bani-Sadr is already fighting a lone battle. The mullahs interpret his instructions as they please. Bani-Sadr cannot count on the assistance of organized supporters. Unlike his political opponents, he has failed to build an effective party of his own, because that did not jibe with his idea of the position of a president standing above all groups and governing with the consensus of all.

Now he is standing outside all groups and will have to deal with a parliament in which his opponents of the orthodox mullah team call the tune.

These had a comparatively easy time during the election, being the only ones to take a united stand in the chaos which dominated the election scene as it does everything else in Iran.

When the 23 million Iranians entitled to vote were called to the polls, not even the number of election districts was known as yet. (Meanwhile it has turned out that there are 191 such.)

What is still not clear is the number of candidates running for a seat in the parliament. The estimate heard most often mentions 3,500 candidates. Others give 2,000 or 4,000, organized in innumerable groupings ranging from pro-Castro people to cryptomonarchists to the leftist religious Mojahedin-e Khalq (Islamic Socialists).

Political programs were neither offered nor in demand. The only thing that mattered was loyalty to the Islamic line. All candidates, including

even a princess, big businessmen and Arab tribal princes from the south, professed to be stanch supporters of the ayatollah. Only secondarily did they state just how they in particular were hoping to gain the voters' support.

Thus a candidate in the holy city of Qum promoted himself as the "prisoner of the shah of the longest standing"--as having spent 25 years in prison. His age: 35. Another candidate promised his electors that he would give them the head of the shah as a present "within 1 year of my election."

In Khuzistan a local matador sought to lure voters with a two-point program. The first point: "Spreading Islam throughout the world"; the second: "Speedy repair of our local bridge."

What had a disastrous effect was that roughly two-thirds of all Iranians can neither read nor write. They often did not even know the names of candidates and were wholly dependent on the mullahs' kind assistance. These were ready everywhere with word and deed and, if need be, also guided the voters' hands. This had its results, for right at the start of the vote count it turned out that the clerics of the IRP had obtained most of the direct mandates. A direct mandate for a seat in parliament was received by anyone who obtained more than 50 percent of the votes in his election district. In districts in which no candidate obtained this total, the two candidates with the greatest number of votes will have to compete in a runoff election on 4 April.

The election victory of theocrats of all shades, who had suffered a clear defeat as recently as at the presidential elections early this year, provoked the suspicion of those who had fallen short.

And it came in handy that, among others, even Ayatollah Morteza Passandideh, Khomeyni's elder brother, complained in a wire to Bani-Sadr that clerics had intimidated voters in his hometown of Khomeyn.

Bani-Sadr immediately ordered an investigation into charges of manipulation, warning that "if we establish that election frauds are widespread and significant, the election will be declared invalid."

This certainly would have been beneficial to the supporters of groupings which were hopelessly behind and particularly President Bani-Sadr himself, who would like to bypass the men-of-God and get together with the United States in the hostage question.

For he sees no possibility of curing the country's threadbare economy without Western aid and has long since ceased to regard the hostage drama as a "trump card," considering it rather to be a "sign of weakness."

True independence from the United States, Bani-Sadr stated in an editorial of the paper ENQELAB-E ESLAMI [ISLAMIC REVOLUTION], calls for "more than

the holding of a few hostages; this little game is ridiculous if one considers that our economy, our administrative apparatus and our army depend on the West, led by the United States."

Bani-Sadr's main concern is to retrieve his compatriots from their revolutionary Islamic dreams into economic reality, which indeed is in bad shape.

At present, oil production, about 6 million barrels a day during the time of the shah, is still below the 2.7 million barrels a day which the government had set at its aim. Big industrial plant is still producing only up to 20 percent of capacity. Construction activity has stopped almost altogether. No one can find his way in the new system of the Islamic banks. Agriculture is laid low. Wages and salaries, on the other hand, under revolutionary pressure have been raised 200 percent.

Bani-Sadr, a graduate economist, can hardly expect any aid from the new Iranian parliament, however, which will consist predominantly of confirmed Islamic deputies with little expert knowledge of the country's practical problems. On the contrary, since the ayatollah last Thursday declared the election to be binding as an "unquestionable decision by the people," the mullah team presumably will immediately make efforts to strip the president of his power.

His expectations of the future are correspondingly modest: "We are like someone drowning who is grasping at straws."

8790
CSO: 4403

ALLEGED SAVINGS IN 1980 SECURITY BUDGET SEEN AS INCORRECT

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 19 Feb 80 p 9

[Article by Avraham Tal: "An Exercise in Deception"]

[Text] When the first reports were published a few weeks ago on the "affair" between the Finance Minister and the Defense Minister regarding conversion of dollars to pounds in the security budget of 1980, there was room to relate to the idea positively for various reasons.

It was estimated that IL 10 billion were involved. Of these, only 5 would be allocated for definite expenditure, whereas the remaining 5 would remain in reserve. These would be expended only if in the course of 1980 moderating circumstances prevail in the economy, and a need arises for a physical "injection" to restimulate activity. Undoubtedly, if such an "injection" is required, it is better to do it through demand for advanced key industries, such as electronics, metals, etc--obvious suppliers of the security system.

It was understood that [defense] monies would be used for acquisitions from local industry and would take the place of foreign purchases. It was further understood that an increase in budgeted use of Israeli pounds would replace the use of "free dollars" (that is, dollars from the Treasury account and not from credit monies or grants from the Government of the United States). These free dollars would be saved. There was also basis for the belief that the increase in local expenditure for purposes of security would be balanced by an equivalent reduction in civilian expenditure. Not a single one of those assumptions came about: the entire sum of IL 10.5 billion was included in the budget of the Defense Ministry as destined for expenditure.

Only half of the amount was allocated for purchases, and only part of the half for purchases of manufacturing enterprises (see below).

As Ze'ev Schiff wrote (HA'ARETZ, 8 Feb), the Defense establishment waived [expenditure of] $414 million in the coming year (1980). But we are discussing the postponement of enterprises only; therefore, it cannot be said

that hundreds of millions of dollars were saved for the Israeli economy. In addition, because of the postponement we are required to commit ourselves to the payment of penalties (according to a report in YEDIOT AHARONOT of 14 February the penalties may total $100 million). If the suppliers in the United States do not agree to a postponement of the implementation of the contracts, or they insist upon the payment of high penalties, it is not completely out of the realm of possibility that it will be decided to implement the undertakings in any case by the year 1980. Only some half of the total "saved" dollars will be in free dollars.

There are no signs that the increase in security expenditures in Israeli pounds is balanced by additional reduction of local expenditure in other sections of the national budget.

In sum, the "selling" to the public of the matter of conversion in the defense budget of dollars for pounds was, in effect if not by design, a semantic exercise in misrepresentation, and decidedly not an honorable one.

Contraction and Expansion

How will local security expenditure increase between the years 1979 and 1980 as a result of this exercise? The following table reflects the change from the budget of 1979 to the budget of 1980, at 1979 prices. The data are taken from details of the proposed national budget.

LOCAL SECURITY EXPENDITURES
CHANGE FROM THE BUDGET OF 1979 TO 1980 IN 1979 PRICES[1]

	IN BILLIONS OF POUNDS	IN PERCENT
Wages	+ 1.64	7
Transfer Payments	+ 0.62	16
Local Purchases	+ 5.54	17
Construction	+ 2.70	52
	+10.50	16

1. Does not include section of emergency expenditures and Territories, which increased by 0.74 billion Israeli pounds.

An increase of 7 percent (more precisely: 7.3 percent) in expenditures for wages, on the assumption that there would be no real increase in the wages of those serving in the military and workers in the security establishment, means an actual increase of manpower. Indeed, IDF is aware of the issue of manpower, and Ze'ev Schiff reports (10 Feb) that "as of now it has been decided that IDF will next year drop some 2,700 from cadres in the regular military. We are talking about 1,000 actual men and the absorption of another 1,700 who were to be added because of new missions." But it appears that simultaneously with these reductions and absorption, there will be an actual expansion of manpower.

Regarding purchases in this country, even if we use the premise that it is desirable to expand demand by the security system for the product of advanced manufacturing enterprises in this country by replacing imports with domestic products (not at the expense of exports production!), it cannot be assumed that all of the increment in local purchases will consist of special items (which would stimulate the economy). Part of it will represent an increase in the purchase of more routine commodities, which the Israeli economy has no particular interest in expanding demand for, particularly during this period.

Attention should also be given to the very significant increase in the construction section, bearing in mind that the 1980 budget does not include a significant increase (as compared to the 1979 budget) in expenditures designed to carry out projects of the new deployment in the Negev (Rimon)

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DECISION ON PLANE OF FUTURE SEEN AS BECOMING MORE PRESSING

Review of Developments

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 15 Feb 80 p 13

[Article by Ze'ev Schiff: "After the First Billion"]

[Text] For a few years now, the security system has delayed its decision concerning the aircraft of the future, which will be operated by the Israeli Air Force during the latter part of the eighties and in the nineties, and which will succeed the F-16. The problem boils down to the question of whether or not to invest in the development of so advanced an aircraft in Israel, in spite of the gigantic outlays involved in this, and in spite of the fact that in any case we shall be clearly required to supply it with an American (or other) engine. Thus, as in the case of the Kfir aircraft, we would apparently be burdened with limitations on export of the aircraft. The second possibility would be to direct efforts to convince the Americans to go along with joint manufacture of a modern aircraft with Israel, with emphasis on manufacture by Israel of the lion's share of the aircraft and permission for Israel to export parts of the aircraft.

The second possibility also entails investment of hundreds of millions of dollars. Of course, this is based on the assumption that Washington would indeed agree to grant the principal authorization, and that the [American] company undertaking joint manufacture with Israel, would indeed agree to basic Israeli specifications.

This decision is of national import and has security, economic, political and technological implications of the first degree. Thus, it is no wonder that responsible officials did not rush into it, and have been inclined to keep putting it off. However, the permanent agent in this country of one of the American companies, declaring that he had learned some details about what Israel intends to do, left, almost in a panic, for the United States at the beginning of the week.

At The Crossroads

For some years the issue was on a small flame, and now it must be decided whether to turn on the burner. In other words, the moment of truth is

approaching with respect to the aircraft of the future of Israel and its manufacture.

Washington had promised that during the month of March of this year, it would respond to Israel's request to aid us in the manufacture of a modern aircraft, or to authorize joint manufacture of an advanced aircraft. But this is not the only reason that prompt Israel to make a decision. Budgetary pressures are doing their work. It must be decided by the security establishment now how much to allocate during the coming year to continue development of the advanced aircraft, which is known publicly by the name Aryeh.

Although a "small flame" was mentioned, it would seem that since the start of research and development, some IL 1 billion (at 1980 prices) have already been expended on the advanced aircraft by the security establishment and Aircraft Industries. We have now come to a kind of road intersection, and we must decide whether to begin a faster pace, and in which direction.

Already in February 1979, when the American Secretary of Defense visited Israel, Ezer Weizman raised in general terms the possibility of joint production of an advanced aircraft by Aircraft Industries and one of the large aircraft manufacturing companies of the United States. About half a year after that, in September 1979, Weizman left for the United States with one of the main goals of his mission being to receive an answer in connection with joint production of the aircraft. The Americans told him that they see the Israeli request in a positive light, but would first have to familiarize themselves with the issue. Subsequently, a technical mission left for the United States for additional clarification of the matter. Washington promised a response by December but that was delayed. Because of the events of Tehran and Afghanistan, Defense Secretary Brown had difficulties in finding time for the matter. Finally it was promised that the answer would be forthcoming during March of this year.

Even from the American viewpoint this is not a question with a simple answer. They must decide what is better from the vantage point of their own interests: to sell complete weapons systems (such as, for example, modern aircraft) to Israel, or to manufacture the American aircraft in Israel? Would the latter possibility limit the number of other advanced aircraft that Israel would seek to acquire in the United States? Would permission for joint production of an aircraft, and perhaps even aid to produce an Israeli aircraft, not lessen the military dependence of Israel on the United States? (This is not desirable in the opinion of specific elements.) Would joint production of an aircraft not hurt American companies? And what precedent would this matter create for other countries in the region, such as Egypt?

A Series of Restrictions

Back in September, the Americans noted during a discussion that they would have to examine whether joint production of an advanced aircraft with

Israel is not in contravention to the guidelines of the White House of May 1977 regarding the policy of transfer of conventional arms to other nations. In these instructions, it was said, among other things, that the United States would not be the first to supply to a specific region armaments which have just recently been developed and which would increase military capability significantly. It was emphasized in these instructions that the United States would not participate in the manufacture of such weapons systems; nor would it participate in joint production for purposes of export only and before the United States military had itself been supplied with these weapons systems.

This is a series of restrictions which provides a ready opening for Washington to return an evasive or unsatisfactory answer from Israel's standpoint on the matter of joint production of an aircraft of the F-18 type. This in spite of the fact that in the same instructions there is a sentence which refers to the United States' honoring its historical responsibility to assure the security of the State of Israel. This is a sentence which the administration may interpret in whatever fashion it may desire.

Israel is weighing its steps on the basis of its own interests and its ability to raise the issue. It is appropriate to note here a number of important landmarks on the issue of the aircraft of the future and the principal difficulties. Talk about the aircraft which would succeed the Kfir and come into operational use around 1985 had already started before the Yom Kippur War. A staff was appointed by the Air Force at the initiative of Benny Feld. The name under which the project was known was "Modern." However, it was not until the Fall of 1974 that there took place in the Defense Ministry the first actual discussion on the matter under the leadership of the Minister. Participating were the representatives of the Air Force, Aircraft Industries, the economic advisor, and others. It was clear that the Air Force was in need of a new aircraft to succeed the Kfir. Aircraft Industries requested that the Air Force define and characterize the required aircraft so that it be able to undertake first steps toward its development.

In retrospect, it is possible to understand why the Air Force declined to commit itself then in the characterization of the future aircraft. The lessons of the Yom Kippur War had not yet been properly formulated, it had in its possession fewer than 5 Kfir aircraft, and it was still unclear what the childhood diseases of these would be. The agreement by the United States to supply Israel with superior aircraft of the F-15 type postponed even further the decision on whether to embark upon production in this country and on what in general was to be expected from Aircraft Industries. Later, when discussions opened regarding acquisition of the lighter and cheaper advanced aircraft, the F-16, an additional reason was added for indecision.

Even afterwards, the Air Force demurred from characterizing its requirements with respect to an aircraft that would be produced in this country.

It anticipated the "very best" which would emerge from American production. There was no discussion at all of the possibility that the Americans might refuse to sell us aircraft in the future. When Major General Benny Feld, commander of the Air Force, did not support the production of a modern aircraft in Israel, the then Minister of Defense Shimon Peres did nothing to oppose this position. Peres was in favor of local production, but he was not prepared to take upon himself a decision in opposition to the position of the Air Force Commander. In addition to this, the then prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, was opposed to the production of a modern aircraft in Israel. The fact that other ministers supported the idea did not help Peres. The demand of Al Schwimmer not to acquire the F-16, to purchase instead more of the F-15's, and to produce an advanced aircraft in this country, was left without a response.

Although the Air Force did not propose a characterization for the aircraft, it was assumed that it would be a twin-engine aircraft.

Two New "Players"

After Ezer Weizman became Defense Minister, a new exhaustive discussion of the issue was undertaken in April 1979. In addition to Weizman and the new Director General, Yosef Ma'ayan, one of the superior technical persons produced by the Air Force, there were two new "dramatis personae" on stage. The place of Al Schwimmer at Aircraft Industries was taken by Gavriel Gidur. The difference in approach between the two was qualitative. Whereas Schwimmer attempted to dictate to the security establishment what should be the operational requirements of the future aircraft, Gidur undertook another approach. His position was that Aircraft Industries is incapable of and unauthorized to dictate the operational requirements to the Air Force. Responsibility rests with the Air Force, (and) he anticipates that the decision will be (the Air Force's).

Benny Feld's position in the Air Force was taken by Major General David Ivry. Under his leadership, the Air Force did not say that it opposed the production of modern aircraft in Israel, but it insisted that the matter not be done with his budget.

The fact that former Finance Minister Ehrlich as well as the Minister of Commerce and Industry Yigal Hurvitz both supported the concept of aircraft production in Israel, made the internal discussions easier. Aircraft Industries, for its part, demanded a decision. Since October 1975 the security establishment has been in financial difficulties, and an agrument ensued on allocations for development of the Aryeh aircraft. Aircraft Industries has stated that it would not be able to bear the large development expenses (construction of configurations, wind-tunnel tests, and the like).

The meeting of April 1979 did end with a decision to produce an Israeli aircraft. It should be remembered that this was after the visit of Secretary Brown to Israel. In the United States, the planning and development

of the F-16 reached advanced stages. But in any case the meeting of April 1979 took an important decision. Ezer Weizman cautioned against dispersal of the planning staff of the Aryeh aircraft, which included scores of qualified engineers with concentrated precious know-how from the west and from the east. He authorized Aircraft Industries to expend the minimum required for it to continue planning and development activities. This meant a budget of $3.5 million, but in actuality there was expended during that year, up to October 1979, $2.9 million.

In this situation, Weizman left for the United States to determine what Washington was prepared to do for Israel on the question of development of an Israeli aircraft for the future, or of joint production of one of America's modern aircraft.

Growing Obsolescence of Existing Aircraft

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 17 Feb 80 p 9

[Article by Ze'ev Schiff: "In the Shadow of Obsolescence"]

[Text] Anyone surveying the Israeli Air Force as it is likely to appear in another 5 to 7 years, will arrive at the inescapable conclusion that although we will receive almost 100 modern aircraft of the F-16 and the F-15 types during the next 3 years, and although the production of modern Kfir aircraft (C-2) is to continue, the Air Force will not see an increase in its number of aircraft, or the increase will be minimal. The reason for this is the increasing obsolescence of other aircraft in the force. Aircraft that used to be considered arrowheads of the force, such as the French Mirage and the American Phantom, are becoming obsolete and their deterioration has increased. This is not to speak of aircraft of the Skyhawk type, which even today are at the tail end of the power scale.

Further on we will survey the order of power of the combat/assault aircraft of the Air Force as seen by the Institute For Strategic Studies of London. In accordance with this release, there will be at the tip of the spear of the force, within a few years, 48 F-15 aircraft and 75 F-16 aircraft. After these comes the main body which includes the Phantom aircraft and the Kfir aircraft. These constitute the backbone of the air power. The Institute states that today Israel has 170 Phantom aircraft.

The acquisition of Phantom aircraft having come to an end, it is clear that we will witness in them an increasing process of obsolescence. The Phantoms will serve us surely to the end of the decade, and beyond. They will in due course replace the Skyhawks. Thus it may be assumed almost with certainty, that within 7 years the power of the Phantom will decrease by natural deterioration and will stand at about 130 to 150 aircraft. With respect to the Kfir aircraft, the Institute for Strategic Studies states that Israel has 60 aircraft of the more modern model (C-2) and another 50 of the older model. Production of the Kfir aircraft will continue during the coming years, with improvements being introduced. Of course, the

scope of production depends upon budgets, but it may be assumed with certainty that during the next 5 to 7 years another several dozens of this type of aircraft will be added.

Changing Threats

After these comes the "tail end" of air power. According to the report of the Institute, these include today 200 old Skyhawk aircraft and another 30 French Mirage aircraft which had been acquired before the Six Day War. In these, there will occur obsolescence and the greatest degree of deterioration. It is possible to assume with certainty that within a period of 10 years, this power, which accounts for between 280 and 300 aircraft, will disappear. In other words, just to replace reitrements and maintain the number of aircraft in the Air Force today, we shall have to acquire or produce during the next decade 250 to 300 additional aircraft. This is in addition to 75 F-16 and other F-15 aircraft which have not yet arrived in this country. Clearly, if our planners seek to strengthen the Israeli Air Force, the needs will be higher.

Even Egypt with whom we have signed a peace agreement will improve and strengthen its air force a great deal. To it will be added Phantom aircraft and F-16 aircraft, and it is not beyond the realm of possibility that at some distant future it will also receive F-15 aircraft.

In all the other Arab air forces a serious revolution has come about. The Jordanian Air Force, which is of a more superior level, and which is but a few minutes flying time from the vital centers of Israel, is destined to receive Mirage F-1 aircraft. In the Air Forces of Syria and Iraq, modern Mig-23, Mig-25, Souchi 22 and Mirage-1 aircraft will take up in the future half if not more of their air power. Nor must we lose sight of the many F-15 aircraft which will begin to arrive in Saudi Arabia in 1981. Even if we eliminate the Egyptian aircraft from the list of threatening factors, the other Arab air forces (including a small air mission from Libya), would still be able to confront us by the middle of the decade with some 1,800 modern fighter/bomber aircraft.

This is a monumental increase and not a simple threat. It must also be borne in mind that these aircraft will be outfitted in the future with more improved air-to-air missiles, with "smart" bombs and with improved electronic armament. Thus, it must be added that the air defense on the other side will be several times more concentrated and will be supported by improved armaments of electronic warfare.

Based upon all the above, there is the prospect that Israeli planners should arrive at a conclusion that between 200 and 300 aircraft are insufficient for the next decade to fill the void resulting from deterioration and obsolescence, and that other modern aircraft must be added.

While we are discussing only sure threats, this is an estimate upon which few will differ. The question is, where will those 200 to 300 aircraft

come from, and of which type of aircraft are we speaking. Will Israel continue to arm itself with aircraft which are defined as the head of the spear, that is improved F-16, F-15 or new models of the F-18? If we are to produce our own aircraft, one possibility is to develop an aircraft that will be able to take its place alongside the F-15 and the F-16 at the spearhead of air power. The second possibility is to develop an aircraft which will take the place of the obsolescent Phantom, at the very center of air power.

This is not only an economic and technological question. First, the operational requirements of this kind of aircraft must be defined. This is not simple, because the spectrum of threats in the arena of the air changes whenever one of the powers which produces aircraft and air armaments develops a new product and supplies it to our neighbors. The responsibility thrust upon the Air Force is great, and every error is apt to be critical when we discuss home production. Thus, it is possible to understand the hesitation of those who are required to characterize the future aircraft needed by Israel, but it is not permissible to allow this kind of hesitation to cause endless delay.

The Strategic Goals

Even now it is clear that in the coming decade the modern aircraft will have to survive in the face of highly concentrated electronic warfare. In the area of sky-to-sky missiles, there will certainly be produced missiles that will reach ranges of tens of kilometers and missiles which can be fired toward their targets from angles of up to 270 degrees [as published]. It is difficult to characterize the aircraft we will be needing when we do not know precisely what is the aircraft of the future of the Russians whose prototype is already being tested.

This, in addition to regional criteria, such as the fact that Israel will be decreased in area (no more airfields in the Sinai up to Ophira) and in number of airfields. We must determine the ranges to which we would want an Israeli aircraft such as this to extend. Are we talking about an attack range covering the area of Arab hostile states, or ability to reach the peripheral countries which are building serious expeditionary forces against us (such as Iraq and Libya)? And against what type of target will such an aircraft be directed: the classical targets which the Israeli Air Force had up to now, or strategic and economic targets?

All these are questions regarding which the planners must receive clear guidelines. And these guidelines cannot come only from the Air Force, but also from those who establish the strategic targets of Israel. Something about the direction of thought in Israel can be inferred from the very nature of the request which Defense Minister Ezer Weizman presented to the Americans in September of last year, to jointly produce the F-18 aircraft. Without taking a position here on differences between the two aircraft models, it is clear that this aircraft will have a capability which was

not built into the F-16, such as the carrying of directional retaliatory missiles, and improved operational capability for the functioning of the aircraft in all kinds of weather and at night. An additional qualitative difference is that the F-18 has two engines, while the F-16 is equipped with but one. This means not only additional security for the aircraft, but also that it is possible to utilize it more during missions of attack at long ranges within enemy territory.

This [F-18] is also a more versatile aircraft, capable of an increased payload of various armaments systems, beginning with "stand off" retaliatory armament, "smart" bombs of various kinds, and a significant load of bombs. What is no less important is that its body is sufficiently large to introduce alterations which the Air Force may find necessary in time. These characteristics point to what the Israeli Air Force is seeking in its future aircraft. However, this is not, as is known, the only option. This we shall discuss in a future article.

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ACTIVATION OF OIL PURCHASE AGREEMENT WITH UNITED STATES OPPOSED

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 24 Mar 80 p 17

[Article by Oded Shorer: "Israel Likely to Pay High Price for Cheap Oil From the United States"]

[Text] Is Israel seeking to activate now the agreement signed with the United States on the supply of oil in an emergency, and is it in regard to this that the trip of Minister of Energy Yitzhaq Moda'i to the United States has been set? Is Israel's situation really so bad, and are its oil storage tanks, which are intended to give it nine months breathing room, empty, or have the sources of supply dried up?

Absolutely not, say oil experts in Israel. Although our situation has never been bright in regard to the procurement of oil, on the basis of the situation in the world market, Israel today has no problem in acquiring the quantities of oil for its requirements.

In order to clarify the picture and to remove the "smoke of battle" which the ministry of energy in Israel has generated, one must understand the background of the signing of the agreement with the United States for the supply of oil during an emergency and also Israel's oil procurement policy which is based on several reliable sources and purchases in the free market of small quantities at relatively high prices.

The agreement with the United States was signed against the background of Israel's concern that Egypt would not provide it with oil as a substitute for the oil pumped from the secure source which Israel discovered in the Alma oil field in the southern Gulf of Suez. With the conclusion of the discussions in Washington, the United States then agreed to sign an agreement which would be an expansion of the agreement signed with the government of Israel in September 1975 during the negotiations on the interim agreement (the 1975 agreement was nullifed with the signing of the new agreement).

Israel Hastened

The agreement signed at the end of the peace talks says "in the event that Israel will be unable to guarantee the satisfaction of its needs through the normal processes, and if circumstances will be such that quantitative restrictions will not be imposed on the United States' ability to obtain oil for its normal needs, the government of the United States will immediately make available oil which Israel can procure in order to satisfy all its normal needs."

It is evident that Israel hastened to sign the pact before the end of June 1979 so that the Export Administration Act, which was approved by Congress during that period, would not be an obstacle. That Act stated that the United States is prohibited from exporting oil from its territory to any country, except those countries which have such an agreement with the United States. As such, the agreement was signed while several of its most important sections remained controversial.

One of the key questions was the subject of price. To date the two countries have not agreed on the interpretation of the words "prices in line with those of the world market prevailing at the time of the supply." In any event, Israel hopes to purchase oil at a price which the United States pays to Saudi Arabia, for example, as opposed to the prices on the world market which are six to seven dollars per barrel higher than this price. In considering Israel's consumption, which is less than 1 percent of the daily consumption of the United States, Israel is seeking to purchase oil at the average price at which the United States purchases it and not at the free market price in case the United States will have to purchase a similar quantity in order to compensate its consumers for the American oil sold to Israel.

An additional problem which has not yet been solved relates to the definition of an emergency situation. Is this to be defined in accordance with the situation of the world market or in accordance with the supply of oil and Israel's possibilities of purchasing oil (at any price) or are perhaps the purchase prices and Israel's financial distress to be considered? At the height of the oil shortage on the world market at the beginning of 1979 (that is to say, before the new agreement), American parties wondered why Israel did not activate the 1975 agreement for the supply of oil during an emergency. This agreement was much more beneficial to Israel than the current agreement since it did not have a time limitation. Israel could activate it or terminate it at will. However, the current agreement speaks about a 15-year period, beginning 26 November 1979 -- the time of the return of the Alma field to Egypt. It is only during this period that Israel can

request oil from the United States. As the years go by, the period of time available to us becomes shorter.

Prices during the past winter soared, and the demand for oil exceeded the supply. It is a fact that the government of Israel considered this and decided not to turn to the Americans since this would constitute an additional factor by means of which the United States would exert pressure upon Israel. The negotiations on the signing of a peace agreement with Egypt were then at their height. The question is then raised as to why precisely today, when the world market is quiet and prices are more or less stable, is Israel asking the United States to consider activating the agreement?

Several Answers

There are several possible answers to this question. Observers in Jerusalem see in such a request -- for the activation of the American commitment -- a kind of shrewd exercise likely to put pressure on the Americans to clarify to Israel's satisfaction those sections in the agreement which have remained generalities. In their opinion, precisely the quiet on the world market, the mild winter in the United States, the absence of any indication of an expected oil shortage, and the fact that this is an election year will permit the minister of energy to obtain an American understanding on the subject of prices, for example. However, the same factors are likely, according to them, to become a stumbling block for us in case this process is not a clever exercise but a hasty step with the intention of implementing the agreement with the United States with the claim that Israel is in an energy emergency situation and it is unable to continue without help from the United States.

A veteran oilman, who on more than one occasion has gone out on missions for the oil companies to seek reliable sources, is completely opposed to Israel's intention to explore the activation of the agreement with the United States. According to him, there is truth in the assumption that Israel can purchase oil from the United States at a price which is lower than that which it would pay through the year to various suppliers. However, the question is if this assumption justifies the dependence upon the United States at this very time. According to him, Israel is satisfying its needs from several sources in agreements which were signed beforehand, and only a small quantity is purchased as crude oil on the free market. Is the concern about a reduction in world trade in oil sufficient in itself to justify now the activation of the agreement which is likely to increase Israel's dependence on the United States? asks the oil man.

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EDITORIAL WARNS OF U.S. MILITARY PLANS FOR ARABS, ARAB GULF AREA

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 21 Feb 80 pp 1,7

[Editorial by Bilal al-Hassan: "U.S. Policy of Force Against Arabs and Through Arabs"]

[Text] Western visitors to the Arab area are numerous.

McHenry is touring the area's capitals so that he may, as he says, understand the Middle East crisis, considering that it is the main issue that confronts him in his work as the U.N. representative to the United Nations.

David (McGovern), the assistant U.S. secretary of defense, is visiting Egypt and Israel, accompanied by a delegation of arms experts and Department of Defense officials.

Earlier, Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security affairs adviser, visited the area. The area was also visited by Lord Carrington, the British secretary of foreign affairs, and by Douglas (Herd), the British secretary of state, who will honor us with another visit.

Why all these visits and are they separate visits or is there a single thread that combines them?

From the facts, we can answer and say that all these visits are a single coordinated political action in which the roles are divided over U.S. and European officials. These visits have one goal, namely to bring in the Arabs and the Arab area within the framework of the U.S. military plans against the Soviet Union and to guarantee the U.S. interests--an action for which we the Arabs have no need and in which we have no interest.

The military goal of these movements is disclosed by Brzezinski frankly and openly when he says in a speech to the International Affairs Council that the "United States must reestablish its military strength which it renounced in the post-Vietnam era."

The U.S.-European coordination of these movements is revealed by Harold Brown, the U.S. secretary of defense, when he says House of Representatives: Britain

is seeking to bolster its naval presence in the Gulf area and other European countries will advance economic aid to continue to bolster the U.S. military presence there.

It also seems from the facts that the United States is working ceaselessly to raise the level of cooperation and efficiency in the international coordination it wants. It is working in four directions:

It is working first in reliance on its direct force by dispatching its naval units to the Arab Gulf borders. The number of these units has reached so far 25 big ships that have been reinforced with infantry troops.

Secondly, the United States is working in the direction of cooperating with the countries that agree to the establishment of bases on their territories. It has made so far direct accomplishments in Oman and Somalia, in addition to its old accomplishments in Dubai and Bahrain.

Thirdly, the United States is working in the direction of preparing Egypt militarily so that it may become the alternative to the Iranian power in the area. This task is undertaken currently by David (McGovern) and his aides who are looking into supplying Egypt with Phantom aircraft and advanced tanks and missiles and who are, moreover, discussing the speedy construction of two air bases in the Negev. These are two bases that are built by the United States for Israel in compensation for two similar bases that Israel will leave Egypt in the Sinai. Four military bases close to the Gulf area and Iran will be thus made available and can be used by the U.S. forces at the right moments. This is in addition to the declared readiness by each of Egypt and Israel to perform direct military roles in implementing the U.S. plans and in addition to the possibility of the establishment of direct military coordination between Israel and Egypt, coordination to which the JERUSALEM POST has referred by saying: Egypt may think seriously of military cooperation with Israel within the framework of a comprehensive strategy in the MIddle East, on the condition that the two parties reach agreement on self-rule.

The fourth direction which the United States is seeking to guarantee concerns the countries of western Europe where Vance is currently conducting an extensive tour for the second time within a short period in an attempt to persuade these countries to adopt the U.S. plan and to participate in it effectively. Vance has not received the response that he wants, especially from France and Japan.

While the United States is working throughout this vast geographical area to bolster the policy of force at the level of the entire world, what must be noticed clearly is that the theater in which it is thinking of using the force is an Arab theater primarily. For this theater to be completely ready for the United States and to be free of vexations, there are direct obstacles that must be eliminated early. These obstacles are:

1. Aden: Thought is given to pouncing on it by way of San'a' or Oman. This explains the great U.S. annoyance with the direct negotiations being conducted

between San'a' and Aden and the other negotiations being conducted between San'a' and Oman under the auspices of Kuwait. All this is accompanied by a resumption of the talk about the Soviet bases in the Democratic Yemen and the talk about participation by forces of the Democratic Yemen in the Afghanistan war as an attempt to distort Aden's reputation and to justify any future action against it.

2. Libya, around which the Egyptian forces have been hovering for years in an attempt to pounce on it but without being able to do so, thanks to the Libyan preparations on the one hand and to the alliances on which Libya relies on the other hand. This does not, however, abolish the fact that the possibility of aggression against Libya is present at every moment, if the proper political circumstances are provided.

3. Syria, whose position toward Camp David constitutes one of the main obstacles in the face of imposing the U.S. plan on the area. Syria is now facing the possibilities of a new clash with Israel--a clash about which the Israeli press is talking openly.

4. The PLO which forms with its political position and its fedayeen action a main obstacle in the face of recruiting a group of moderate Palestinians to accept the logic of self-rule offered by the Camp David accords.

In its persistent efforts to overcome or control these obstacles, the United States projects through its information media and its political contracts two fundamental maneuvers seeking to gain Arab support. The first maneuver focuses on flourishing the Soviet danger threatening the Gulf oil and the second maneuver focuses on luring the Arab rulers with a developed form of self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza strip, along with a promise that this will be a first step toward a Palestinian state.

Amidst this U.S. picture with its strategic dimensions, its expected battles and its projected maneuvers, the theater is empty of any Arab counter-strategy. The Arab countries are acting as if they are a bunch of separate axes at times and conflicting axes at others.

Amidst this situation, it is not at all right to say that the Baghdad summit took care of formulating the required strategy. This summit dealt with the issue of imposing sanctions and pressures on al-Sadat's regime, but without being able to formulate a common alternative plan.

Unless this Arab alternative plan is formulated and unless some party takes the initiative to move toward this plan, the possibilities of danger engulfing the area seem extremely large and whoever thinks that he can stay outside the circle of the danger [when the danger erupts] is wrong.

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CSO: 4802

TUWAYNI, AMBASSADOR TO UN, ON U.S. 'PRESSURE'

Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English 31 Mar 80 pp 14-17

[Interview with Ghassan Tuwayni by Lydia Georgi in New York, date not given]

[Text] The Lebanese ambassador to the United Nations, Ghassan Tueni, says that the United States is reducing its pressure on Israel to stop destabilizing South Lebanon, and that this is partly due to the U.S. Presidential elections.

Talking from New York in a long-distance telephone interview with *Monday Morning* last week, Tueni said, "The intensity of U.S. pressure on Israel concerning Lebanon has been reduced, I believe. I'm not sure that (Lebanon is) at the top of the U.S. priority list, as compared with Israel. This is indeed very sad and requires a reassessment of a number of things on our part."

Speculating about the factors that have prompted Washington to ease its pressure on the Jewish state, Tueni cited the Presidential elections, the Jewish uproar over the U.S. vote in favor of the recent Security Council resolution condemning the Israeli settlements policy, and President Carter's forthcoming summit talks with Israeli Premier Menahem Begin.

"But," he qualified, "the U.S. is definitely committed to preventing Israel from destroying the Security Council resolutions on South Lebanon."

Israel's recent escalation of its aggression against South Lebanon was partly aimed at "testing" the Palestinians and the Syrians, Tueni said, noting that this was a "dangerous" development, because the Israelis "could very well be preparing for a major operation later."

Whether Israel will in fact mount such an operation, the Lebanese diplomat said, will depend on whether the Palestinian commandos drop their diplomatic offensive and revert to *fedayeen* methods, how the Egyptian-Israeli talks fare, the state of relations between the two superpowers and the development of Israel's internal policy.

But he doubted that Israel would detonate the South Lebanese situation before May to divert attention from the outcome of its Palestinian autonomy talks with Egypt.

"On the contrary," he said, "I think the Israelis will try to avoid giving the Egyptians any excuse to accuse them of provoking a major flareup." If it is contemplating the provocation of major hostilities, Israel is more likely to "relate the provocation" to factors which have nothing to do with its talks with Egypt, Tueni said.

He added that he did not know whether Lebanon was on the agendas of the American-Israeli and American-Egyptian mid-April summit talks, but he hoped that it was not.

"Our policy has always been to present (the Lebanese question) as a question that is independent of the Camp David process and other steps aimed at solving the Middle East crisis," he explained, because otherwise "we fear we will be an easy prey or a casualty in the bargain."

Tueni said he did not favor the withdrawal of the U.N. peace-keeping troops (UNIFIL) from South Lebanon, but he did not exclude the possibility of their withdrawal.

"What I do want to emphasize," he added, "is that Lebanon would lose much less than others by UNIFIL's departure. And Lebanon would certainly lose more by the continued inability of UNIFIL to fulfill its mandate."

When UNIFIL was established in 1978, there was consensus in the Security Council, Tueni said, but "we are far from this consensus today" and "I think this lack of consensus is reflecting on UNIFIL's capabilities." The interpretation of the U.N. force's mandate is now "subject to all the contradictions that exist in the Security Council."

My first question to Ambassador Tueni was about the motives of Israel's South Lebanon escalation:

What do you believe are the reasons for the latest escalation of the situation in South Lebanon:

• Israel's desire to undermine the national accord process in Lebanon, as Premier Hoss has charged?

• The beginning of an attempt by Israel to cripple the Palestinian Resistance in Lebanon, to impose autonomy in the occupied territories, as some Palestinian leaders have said?

• An attempt by Israel to empty the South of its inhabitants so as to settle the Palestinians in parts of it?

I think that the reason includes the three objectives you have mentioned and probably a few others as well. The truth of the matter is that Israeli policy is really a strategy which always follows a number of objectives that complement each other. And these objectives vary only in intensity according to their context and prevailing conditions.

I think there were two principal targets:

The first target was, of course, to destabilize the internal situation. And I think that objective has not been realized.

The second objective was to test both the Palestinians and the Syrians. I don't think that the Israelis wanted to go for an all-out war. They merely wanted to make

this test. This is much more dangerous, because they could very well be preparing for a major operation later.

Driving the population out of the South is, of course, a strategic objective which is always there. It is in the background, it is recurrent. They are determined to destroy as much of the South as possible. And I emphasized this aspect in the speech I made in the Security Council when the Council was debating Israeli settlements in the West Bank. I emphasized the parallelism between establishing Jewish settlements in the West Bank and creating a vacuum in the South to establish the Palestinians in a substitute homeland.

But you think that Israel's attempt to undermine the national accord process will fail?

It has failed. They have tried and the attempt has not been successful.

You said Israel was testing the Syrians and the Palestinians. Do you think it will really carry out a major operation at a later date?

It is difficult to know. This will, of course, depend on several factors.

It will depend, for one thing, on whether Palestinian action breaks away from its present diplomatic sanctuary and returns to its former *fedayeen* struggle.

Secondly, it will depend on the development of the negotiations between Egypt and Israel.

A third factor is the state of relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

It will also depend, to a great extent, on internal Israeli policy, which is a factor that we very often ignore. I think Israel's attacks on Lebanon, in particular, are often an expression or projection of Israeli internal policy.

Do you share the view expressed by some politicians that Israel will try to detonate the situation in the area before May to cover up for the autonomy negotiations scheduled to be completed by then? If so, do you think this detonation is likely to take place in South Lebanon?

I think the only place where the situation can be detonated is South Lebanon. Whether Israel will detonate the situation, as you say, before May or not is questionable. On the contrary, I think the Israelis will try to avoid giving the Egyptians any excuse to accuse them of provoking a major flareup. I doubt that the Israelis will relate it to what happens in May. They may, however, choose to relate the provocation to other factors.

Do you intend to request a Security Council meeting to debate the Israeli aggression against Lebanon? What could the outcome of such a meeting be? Would you press for a new resolution? What kind of resolution, and do you think it would have a better chance of yielding positive results than the previous ones?

It is premature to ask those questions. I think that Lebanon should play the few cards it has close to the chest. We have complained to the Security Council; we have reserved our right to press for an urgent meeting. We will only hold a meeting if there is an escalation, if the situation gets out of control, which hasn't happened so far.

But when the meeting does take place, then we will debate and determine what sort of resolution we will require.

But there is one point that I have often made and that I want to emphasize again: the Security Council is not a worker of miracles. It is really a meeting of various wills. The outcome of any Security Council meeting would depend on the attitudes of the various members of the Council.

The Lebanese government has called on the U.S. to exert pressure on Israel to stop its attacks on the South. Has such pressure been exerted and ignored by Israel or has the American government turned a deaf ear to Lebanon's appeal?

The pressure has been exerted. It was exerted again yesterday (Thursday) because there were some attacks against the United Nations' observation positions in the border area, or the "enclave," as it is called.

But the degree or intensity of this U.S. pressure on Israel concerning Lebanon has been reduced, I believe. I'm not sure that we are at the top of the U.S. priority list, as compared with Israel. This is indeed very sad and requires a reassessment of a number of things on our part.

The elections are an important factor in the United States. The March 1 vote in the Security Council on the issue of Jewish settlements is an important factor. The fact that the U.S. is now preparing for mid-April summit conversations with Begin and Sadat is yet another factor.

But the U.S. is definitely committed to preventing Israel from destroying the Security Council resolutions on South Lebanon.

Do you think that the question of Lebanon will come up in the separate talks that Carter will hold with Begin and Sadat?

I don't know if we are on the agenda, and I hope we are not.

Our policy has always been to insulate the Lebanese question, to present it as a question that is independent of the Camp David process and other such steps aimed at solving the Middle East crisis. Peace in Lebanon should not be contingent upon what happens elsewhere, because we fear we will be an easy prey or a casualty in the bargain.

UNIFIL troops are more and more coming under fire during the artillery exchanges between the opposing factions in South Lebanon, and you once warned that UNIFIL might withdraw if the situation in the South continued to deteriorate. Do you see the possibility of such a withdrawal in the near future?

I don't exclude it. I don't know what will happen if there is a withdrawal of UNIFIL. But there again, I think it is difficult now to discuss this specific issue.

What I do want to emphasize is that Lebanon would lose much less than others by UNIFIL's departure. And Lebanon would certainly lose more by the continued inability of UNIFIL to fulfill its mandate.

But UNIFIL is not responsible for not fulfilling its mandate. The fault lies in the fact that the mandate has now been placed in such a position that its interpretation is subject to all the contradictions that exist in the Security Council.

You seem to share the view of House speaker Kamel Assad, who says that if UNIFIL is to remain powerless, it would be better if it withdrew, regardless of the risks involved.

No, I don't share his view. But UNIFIL is under the command of the Security Council. When UNIFIL was created there was a consensus in the Security Council. We are very far from this consensus today.

I think this lack of consensus is reflecting on UNIFIL's capabilities. But I am not advocating the departure of UNIFIL.

Why have you absolved the forces of Saad Haddad from having participated in the shelling of South Lebanese towns, when they themselves have claimed to have bombarded Sidon and its suburbs and have threatened more attacks if their demands are not met?

I have not absolved Saad Haddad. But I think the quality of the artillery and the whole action is far beyond Haddad's capabilities. It is Israel which is responsible.

Do you think the status quo in the Middle East and therefore in South Lebanon will be maintained pending the outcome of the U.S. presidential elections?

I think it is difficult to prevent the dynamics of the situation from developing. And I think it is difficult even for the U.S. to artificially maintain a status quo, as you call it. I know that what is happening in the Middle East is of direct significance in the U.S. elections, as witness Tuesday's primaries in New York. But I doubt very much that the situation will be maintained in a state of total immobilization pending the elections.

You once told this magazine that peace in Lebanon "cannot and shall not" wait for peace in the area. Do you still hold the view that it is possible to dissociate the two crises?

I think we have to try to.

But is it possible?

I don't think it is impossible.

How? In what way do you see such a thing taking place?

This involves very difficult chemistry, as we say here. And it requires two preconditions: one, a unity of mind among the Lebanese, and, two, greater coordination between Lebanon and the Palestinians. But there are no magic recipes for that.

But the Palestinians are going to remain in Lebanon as long as they don't have a state.

Yes, but the difference lies in what they do in Lebanon, not whether they remain or don't remain. This is the core of the issue as debated at the summit in Tunis.

Do the Palestinians turn South Lebanon into an arena, and do they have an interest in doing so? Or do they allow Lebanon's institutions to be reconstructed and Lebanon to become more effective and efficient in assisting the Palestinians through other methods?

Do you think Israel will let this happen?

Israel definitely does not have an interest in letting this happen. But it is up to us to force our own strategy on Israel and not sit back and say, "Israel will not allow this or that to happen, and therefore we must accept it as a fact of life."

Israel's interests lie in the continuous destabilization of Lebanon and in preventing the Lebanese and the Palestinians from realizing that their strategic objectives are probably closer to each other than either imagines.

The Lebanese government recently defined one of the mainstays of the country's new defense policy as being resistance to Israeli occupation in South Lebanon. How can this be achieved, in your opinion? By sending the Lebanese Army to the South? By turning UNIFIL into a deterrent force--a possibility you have often discarded? What other way do you see?

I think the answer is in a mixture of various ways and means. But certainly the construction and consolidation of the Lebanese Army is the principal instrument of the Lebanese defense policy. UNIFIL will be an accessory--an accessory with decreasing importance, because UNIFIL is an interim force.

The new defense policy also calls for the implementation of existing Lebanese-Palestinian agreements in the framework of Security Council resolutions on South Lebanon. How do you envisage the application of this clause?

I read in this clause that those agreements between Lebanon and the PLO should not prevent the U.N. from implementing Resolution 425 or serve as a pretext for nonimplementation.
But how can it be done, practically, on the ground.

I'm on the ground and I don't think it would be useful to elaborate on this subject. It is more a matter of action--a day-to-day pattern of coexistence--than a theoretical attitude or analysis.

Since the Norwegian government has turned down the U.N.'s request to send additional troops to replace the withdrawing Nepalese contingent, and since Ghana will reportedly send only 300 men, how does the U.N. intend to fill the remaining gap?

I don't know.

What countries are being approached?

I don't think that is an issue now.

CSO: 4820

SHAM'UN COMMENTS ON MID-EAST SITUATION

Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English 24-30 Mar 80 pp 16-20

[Interview with Camille Sham'un, head of National Liberal Party, by Claude Khoury, date and place not given]

[Text] Former President Camille Chamoun, leader of the rightist National Liberal Party, says he would not object to talks with the Syrian authorities if the ultimate object was the withdrawal of the Syrian troops of the Arab Deterrent Forces from Lebanon.

"This withdrawal," the rightist leader told *Monday Morning* in an interview last week, "should begin and be completed in a period to be determined by common consent."

Chamoun said he was also in favor of resuming talks with the Palestine Liberation Organization which would lead to an agreement allowing the Palestinians to continue to live in Lebanon until their problem was solved, without posing a threat to the internal and external security of Lebanon.

"We are not doing anything against the Palestinians, and we are ready never to do anything against them," he said. "We will wait until their problem has been settled, either at the United Nations or by other international means."

If the Syrians withdraw from Lebanon and the Palestinians agree to live peacefully in Lebanon, Lebanese-Syrian and Lebanese-Palestinian relations can return to normal before the Middle Eastern crisis is settled, Chamoun said.

The former President, the elected leader of the rightist Lebanese Front alliance, expressed the view that the recent French-led West European campaign of support for the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and statehood should not be taken at face value.

Western Europe's pro-Palestinian stance may have been adopted "to exert pressure on the Israelis on the eve of the meeting between the Israelis and the Egyptians," in the hope that "such pressure would bring about an agreement between

the Egyptians and the Israelis on the future of the occupied parts of Palestine," he said.

He added: "In my opinion, the statements made by (French President Valery Giscard) d'Estaing and the other responsible people in Europe, along with the invitation from President Carter to (Egyptian President Anwar) Sadat and (Israeli Premier Menahem) Begin to meet him in Washington, are all part of a plan to bring the two Middle Eastern leaders closer to an agreement."

Turning to inter-Lebanese problems, Chamoun indicated that he still believed the federal system of government would be the best for post-war Lebanon, as it was for the various communities which are now living peacefully together in Switzerland.

"Here in Lebanon, we belong to one big Lebanese family, but there are some differences among the elements. If each one is allowed to develop his life within the framework of national aspirations, I think we will have found the formula for the future of the country," he said.

Chamoun, who recently escaped an attenipt on his life, said he knew who the perpetrators were.

"So far we do not have the actual names, but I personally know the group of people that did it," he said. "However, I can't say anything before the end of the investigations."

The full interview, which was conducted in English, follows:

HAVE THE INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE ATTEMPT ON YOUR LIFE PRODUCED ANY RESULTS?

There have been two investigations — an official investigation by the public prosecutor and another by our own services.

So far we do not have the actual names, but I personally know the group of people that did it. However, I can't say anything before the end of the investigations.

WHAT CAN UNIFIL DO TO EXTEND ITS AREA OF OPERATIONS INTO THE SOUTH LEBANON ENCLAVE STILL UNDER THE CONTROL OF MAJOR SAAD HADDAD?

I don't understand why you always want to know what's going to happen in the enclave under the control of Saad Haddad.

Saad Haddad is a Lebanese officer. He is commanding an army which is part of the Lebanese Army. After all, they are all Lebanese. Why are you asking about the enclave under the control of Saad Haddad and not asking about those areas in the South which are under the control of armed Palestinians?

UNIFIL should extend its area of operations to wherever there are armed people other than the Lebanese Army. That is how they can do their real job, which is to protect the sovereignty of Lebanon over its lands.

DO YOU VISUALIZE A SITUATION IN WHICH NATIONAL ACCORD IS ACHIEVED IN LEBANON AND SMOOTH RELATIONS ARE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN LEBANON, SYRIA AND THE PLO?

Yes, certainly there is a way to reach an agreement and smooth the relations between Lebanon, Syria and the PLO.

The way is for the Syrian troops to withdraw from Lebanon. They have already withdrawn from a small part of the country – from areas like Sinn el-Fil and neighboring places. But they are still evident in force in other parts of Lebanon – the Beqaa, Dhour el-Shwair and the road to Zahle, as well as in the Shouf area.

As for the PLO... well, I think they must withdraw from the areas they have occupied by force – like Shiyah, Haret Hreik, Damour, and so on.

If they withdraw and if they cease to pose a threat to the internal and external security in Lebanon, I think there can be an agreement, and the relations between the Lebanese, the Syrians and the PLO people may slowly return to normal.

THERE HAS BEEN A FEELING AMONG THE PEOPLE LATELY THAT YOU ARE PREPARED TO INITIATE A DIALOGUE WITH THE SYRIANS AND THE PLO. THERE HAS BEEN A FEELING OF OPTIMISM THAT THINGS CAN BE SETTLED BETWEEN YOU AND THE SYRIANS AND THE PLO. IS THIS TRUE, OR DO YOU STILL HOLD THE POSITION THAT THERE CAN BE NO DIALOGUE WITH THE SYRIANS AND THE PALESTINIANS AS LONG AS THEY REMAIN IN LEBANON?

Not the Palestinians.

The Palestinian case is quite different from the Syrian case. The Palestinians are here. They have been here since 1948. We are not doing anything against the Palestinians, and we are ready never to do anything against them. We will wait until their problem has been settled, either at the United Nations or by other international means.

There have been some talks between us and the Palestinians, but this was a long time ago. Those talks could have been a success to a certain extent because we had agreed on the important problems concerning the Palestinians in Lebanon.

We had promised each other to hold more meetings which would have included more people. Then there was pressure put and the Palestinians, but this was a long time ago. Those talks could have been a success to a certain extent because we had agreed on the important problems concerning the Palestinians in Lebanon.

We had promised each other to hold more meetings which would have included more people. Then there was pressure put on the Palestinians to stop these talks. It is no secret that those who opposed the talks were, unfortunately, the Syrians. They did not want the Palestinians to continue their talks with the Lebanese.

Now, I am ready to carry on with these talks with the Palestinians. I have no objection to that at all.

But will the Syrians allow us to have talks with the Palestinians? This is the main point. This is the main difficulty that will stand in the way of talks. But as I said just a few days ago, I am ready to resume talks with the Palestinians.

As far as the Syrians are concerned, the problem is different. After all, Lebanon is a free and independent country. The Syrians cannot go on occupying this country against the will of its population.

I do not object to talks going on with the Syrians, but these talks must aim at

the withdrawal of the Syrians and this withdrawal should begin and be completed in a period to be determined and fixed by common agreement.

DO YOU THINK THAT THE SITUATION IN LEBANON CAN BE STABILIZED PENDING AN OVERALL SOLUTION OF THE MIDEAST CRISIS, OR IS LEBANON'S FATE DEPENDENT ON WHAT HAPPENS IN THE REGION AS A WHOLE?

I think that in spite of what has happened during the last four years, the situation can, to a great extent, be normalized in Lebanon. This can happen if there is a withdrawal of the Syrian troops from Lebanon by common consent of Lebanon and Syria, and if, on the other hand, the Palestinians stop posing a threat to the internal and external security of Lebanon.

The Palestinians can still live in Lebanon until a solution is found to the Palestinian question. If the Syrians withdraw and the Palestinians are living peacefully in Lebanon, the situation can return to normal without any trouble for anybody. There will be no crisis in Lebanon. There may still be a Middle East crisis until the Palestinian question is settled, but there will be no crisis in Lebanon.

That is what I mean when I say that the situation can return to normal in Lebanon.

THE EEC IS ABOUT TO HAMMER OUT A NEW MIDEAST DECLARATION THAT WILL PRESUMABLY SUPPORT PRESIDENT VALERY GISCARD D'ESTAING'S CALL FOR PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND A PALESTINIAN HOMELAND. DOES THE LEBANESE FRONT SUPPORT THIS POSITION, INCLUDING THE CREATION OF A PALESTINIAN STATE? IF SO, WHAT CAN THE LEBANESE FRONT DO TO HELP?

I don't know to what extent President Valery Giscard d'Estaing means those statements he made in Kuwait, Bahrain and the other Arab states he visited.

And I also don't know whether the other responsible people in Germany or in Italy or in the United Kingdom mean what they said in their declaration concerning the recognition of the Palestinians' right to self-determination.

They may have meant it, or they may have made the declaration to exert pressure on the Israelis on the eve of the meeting between the Israelis and the Egyptians. They may have felt that such pressure would bring about an agreement between the Egyptians and Israelis on the future of the occupied parts of Palestine.

There have been differences between the position adopted by Sadat and the position adopted by Begin over the future of the occupied lands. This disagreement has gone too far and lasted too long – more than a year.

In my opinion, the statements made by d'Estaing and the other responsible people in Europe, along with the invitation from President Carter to Sadat and Begin to meet with him in Washington, are all part of a plan to bring the two Middle Eastern leaders closer to an agreement.

BUT DOES THE LEBANESE FRONT SUPPORT SUCH A POSITION, INCLUDING THE CREATION OF A PALESTINIAN STATE? CAN YOU HELP?

Unfortunately, I don't know what we can do to help. We have not been consulted about the Camp David process and I don't know if we can exert any influence on the parties concerned. But so far, we haven't done anything to prevent

the creation of a Palestinian state.

Our conflict with the Palestinians was here in Lebanon and not outside Lebanon. It goes back to 1968, when the trouble began between the Palestinians and the Lebanese Army.

In 1973 there was trouble again between the Palestinians and the Lebanese Army, and in 1975 the troubles began between the Palestinians and the Lebanese.

We are unable to do anything about the creation of a Palestinian state. We cannot do anything to prevent it and we cannot do anything to promote it.

KING HUSSEIN HAS TOLD THIS MAGAZINE THAT THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS HAS RUN AGROUND. DO YOU SHARE HIS VIEW? AND AS A VETERAN OF LEBANESE AND MIDEAST POLITICS, WHERE DO YOU THINK THE OVERALL SOLUTION TO THE MIDEAST CRISIS LIES?

If we have to express an opinion about Camp David, we must take the relations between Israel and Egypt into consideration.

Camp David has undoubtedly put an end to the threat of war which existed between the two countries. They have now exchanged ambassadors and they have established diplomatic relations. And the Israelis are withdrawing from Egyptian territories, in accordance with the agreement.

It has been a success as far as the relations between the two participating parties are concerned. But it has been a failure because it hasn't succeeded in bringing peace to the Middle East.

The problem remains the same as long as there hasn't been a solution to the Palestinian problem. The Middle East crisis exists because there has not been a solution to the Palestinian problem.

An overall solution will only come with the solution for all of the Middle East. Otherwise, these new relations which are the result of Camp David will apply only to Egypt and Israel. All the other parts of the Middle East will still be in trouble.

YOU RECENTLY STATED THAT THE FEDERAL SYSTEM SHOULD BE APPLIED IN LEBANON. DOES THIS MEAN THAT THE 1943 FORMULA IS NOW DEFUNCT?

It will be defunct only if another formula is adopted. In my opinion, the federal system is the best formula for the future of Lebanon.

Whether we like it or not, whether we approve of it or not, there are some differences among the population of Lebanon, just as there were some differences among the people who created Switzerland. You had the Swiss of French origin, the Swiss of Italian origin, the Swiss of German origin and the Swiss themselves. They couldn't agree on many things, but they wanted to remain one state, have one foreign policy and one army. The only way to iron out all these differences was the federal system which was adopted in Switzerland. It has survived two world wars in which the French fought the Germans. The wars did not affect the unity of Switzerland.

I think this solution should be applied to Lebanon because of the differences which exist among the population of Lebanon.

If we really want to avoid any conflict in the future, we must deal with these differences. We must try to find a solution, provided we can save the unity of the land and the unity of the national aspirations of the country and of the Lebanese people as a whole.

We must, in the future, do all that we can to prevent friction and conflict among

the different elements of the Lebanese population.

For example, if you have a family with four or five children you must preserve the unity of the family by recognizing that each of these children is different from the others. You must be careful to avoid conflicts between the sons within the family.

By giving everyone a niche in which he can develop his own personal life, you can prevent disagreement among the members of the family.

Here in Lebanon we belong to one big Lebanese family, but there are some differences among the elements. If each one is allowed to develop his life within the framework of national aspirations, I think we will have found the formula for the future of the country.

WHAT ARE THE CHANCES, IF ANY, OF THE LEBANESE FRONT MAKING UP WITH FORMER PRESIDENT FRANJIEH?

I don't think there are any differences between the Lebanese Front as a Front and Franjieh. There has been a conflict between Franjieh and the Kataeb (Phalangist Party). Personally, I have maintained good relations with both of them – with the Kataeb and President Franjieh.

I have been and I am still working very hard to iron out all the differences between them so that every man, every family who had to leave North Lebanon and come here – and vice-versa – can return to their homes. I want them to go back to their homes, back to their work and their activities and live as they did in the past.

CSO: 4820

EXPORT ACTIVITY IN RECENT YEARS DISCUSSED

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 25 Feb 80 p 5

[Article: "24,000 Import, Export and Factory Foundation Formalities Handled by General Department of Industry; Complaint of Shortages of Administrative Personnel"]

[Text] The General Department of Industry is complaining of the large number of unfilled jobs in its cadre, considering that it has only 25 administrative workers out of an original number of 77 such workers allocated for the department's cadre.

Last year, the General Department completed 4,568 formalities connected with the import of materials and commodities and the foundation of new industries and 20,000 formalities connected with the export of industrial products.

The most important conclusions made by the General Department from these formalities are:

Industrial establishments registered and starting production in 1979:

The number of new industrial establishments registered in the past year amounted to 375 with a nominal capital of 121,237,000 Lebanese pounds and with a total of nearly 4,000 workers. The products of these establishments are distributed over several branches of the industry, the most important being: Candy, chocolates, cement blocks, wooden furniture and crafts, plastic bags, ready-made clothes, cement mixers and compactors, mineral water bottling, aluminum furniture [manjurat], paints, fiberglass, tin cans, metal furniture, aluminum (venetian blinds), cassettes and cartridges, textile and tricot, fruit juice, refrigerators and grain mills.

Industrial Establishments That Have Gained Approval to Be Founded:

The number of such establishments has reached 138 with an employed capital of 739.8 million Lebanese pounds.

It is worth noting here that this figure represents theoretically the new industrial projects whereas, in fact, only a small percentage of no more than 30 percent of these projects is implemented. It is hoped that these indicators will be more realistic in the future, considering that the owner of a new project now has to submit a technical economic study demonstrating the project's industrial feasibility.

Industrial Products Export Movement:

The value of last year's exports amounted to 1.2 billion Lebanese pounds.

Imported Machinery:

Its value amounted to 481 million Lebanese pounds.

In the annual report it prepares, the General Department has focused on underlining the industrial exports--statistics on which are gathered in the two following charts.

[See 2 charts on following pages]

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Lebanese Products Exported in Accordance With Certificate of Origin and According to Type for Past 10 Years

Unit: 1,000 Lebanese Pounds

Type of Product	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1977	1978	1979
Foodstuffs	20,978	22,201	21,946	25,654	58,210	30,424	38,648	36,325	184,185
Drinks [alcoholic]	502	429	265	1,003	389	380	2,543	37,628	7,190
Textiles	21,674	29,212	46,015	65,054	88,528	56,161	42,805	35,779	32,582
Shoes	839	1,735	2,639	3,441	6,840	8,294	5,188	(9,843)	9,507
Clothing	10,655	15,318	23,968	40,195	43,934	43,957	42,906	29,435	90,027
Plywood	6,610	10,641	19,191	17,078	5,925	4,585	2,813	3,316	4,643
Wooden furniture and crafts	3,831	4,899	9,954	9,590	16,486	13,994	14,082	19,434	23,322
Tanned Leathers	257	668	5,610	17,332	31,107	22,983	22,713	24,630	24,571
Chemical Industries	32,346	33,782	33,548	40,412	47,065	64,660	63,140	59,521	184,933
Electrical equipment and appliances	1,050	3,613	5,022	5,518	1,568	692	68,465	72,096	61,084
Paper and paper crafts	8,623	11,451	27,739	32,464	56,821	29,806	70,561	53,547	56,609
Scrap metals	5,107	8,156	5,812	8,778	11,173	11,422	49,765	43,207	25,009
Non-mineral mine products	25,819	32,866	34,701	34,561	118,526	113,352	194,569	132,900	287,432
Metal industries	51,124	59,994	79,769	96,377	246,736	168,203	123,861	136,639	150,840
Plastic industries	8,029	10,366	14,908	28,336	45,106	31,025	33,895	46,313	56,609
Micellaneous industries	10,989	16,422	25,362	20,558	58,438	20,000	59,998	39,772	84,133
Total	208,308	261,773	245,449	446,342	836,492	623,893	836,152	772,378	1,262,988

Lebanese Industrial Products Exported in Past 10 Years

Unit: 1,000 Lebanese Pounds

Year	Saudi Arabia	Jordan	Iraq	Arab Gulf	Kuwait	Egypt	Syria	Libya	EEC	Grand Total
1970	74,961	17,344	39,773	83,196	19,398	4,286	16,089	13,460	14,031	208,308
1971	86,945	24,921	43,825	5,591 [sic]	16,995	8,619	35,367	17,791	22,130	261,773
1972	121,988	30,936	53,843	2,738	16,538	7,719	33,622	30,893	17,637	345,449
1973	157,392	24,527	46,051	7,274	17,468	6,322	44,103	48,741	53,384	446,342
1974	261,937	37,539	130,479	23,112	19,714	14,315	170,957	60,362	50,030	836,492
1975	287,576	34,935	93,211	11,731	8,730	19,250	85,008	8,184	34,044	623,893
1977	461,065	71,379	70,036	28,236	14,604	19,298	111,165	7,875	25,404	836,152
1978	450,217	68,210	95,940	27,101	13,999	23,291	40,908	4,649	28,308	772,378
1979	601,122	89,749	338,825	29,787	26,024	38,102	84,272	11,416	38,691	1,262,988

BRIEFS

ARMY WEAPONS--A new consignment of weapons for the Lebanese army will arrive in Beirut port in the next 3 days. The consignment consists of eight 155-mm guns, antiarmor (TU-type) missiles, 24 120-mm guns, 30 81-mm mortars, 3,000 U.S.-made rifles with their munitions, 400 Romanian-made RPG's out of a total of 10,000 rifles. The new consignment also includes the four half-tracks which had been seized, and then released, by Libya. [Text] [Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 28 Feb 80 p 4] 8494

SAUDI CRUDE OIL SUPPLIES--Kasrawan Labaki, the general secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, has announced that the ministry has received from the Lebanese Embassy in Jiddah the Saudi authorities' approval of Lebanon's request for supplying the Tripoli refinery with 400,000 tons of crude oil to refine them and provide the local fuel consumption needs. It is to be noted that Engineer Anwar al-Sabbah, the minister of industry and oil, was planning to visit Saudi Arabia to discuss with the officials there the question of continuing to supply the Tripoli refinery with light crude through al-Zahrani refinery in view of the fact that the Tapline stopped delivering these supplies as of the beginning of 1980. However, no date has been set for this visit. The quantity of 400,000 tons which Saudi Arabia has agreed to supply to Lebanon constitutes a part of the refinery's annual need which amounts to 1.2 million tons. It seems that this quantity [of 400,000 tons] has been given to run the installations for 3 or more months until a decision is made on the issue in its entirety. The fact is that the conditions engulfing the marketing of the refined products of the Tripoli refinery do not make it necessary to try to secure the entire quantity at present because the accumulation of products in the refinery storehouse is liable to lead to reduced production. The price set for the Saudi crude has not been known. It is not known whether this price will be equal to the price adopted currently or the special price from which Lebanon used to benefit last year. The General Department of Oil recently invited bids for transporting 400,000 tons of crude oil from al-Zahrani refinery to Tripoli refinery. [Text] [Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 21 Feb 80 p 5] 8494

RESUMPTION OF LIBYAN AID--Tunis--Hamadi al-Sayd, the Arab League representative in the Arab Followup Committee in Lebanon, stated upon arrival in Tunis from Tripoli yesterday evening that Col Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi "has lifted all the reservations expressed by his country over the financial aid

determined for Lebanon by the recent Arab summit." Al-Sayd added: "Al-Qadhdhafi has promised to advance all possibile aid to Lebanon in accordance with the summit resolutions and he will issue his instructions for facilitating this matter and for implementing it as soon as possible in accordance with the measures in force in the Jamahiriyah." The League sources have said that al-Sayd, who had met in Tripoli with al-Qadhdhafi and Dr 'Ali 'Abd-al-Salam al-Turayki, the Libyan secretary of foreign affairs, brought up the issue of the Tunisian-Libyan crisis and pointed out that the arrival of a number of Arab ministers of foreign affairs to the Arab League headquarters makes postponement of the emergency meeting of the League Council extremely difficult. But the same sources explained at the same time that the League will exert efforts to postpone the meeting scheduled to be held tomorrow for a day or two so that an opportunity may be provided for holding consultations among the Arab parties concerned to contain the crisis between the two Arab countries. The sources concluded by saying that al-Sayd has returned with a Libyan agreement in principle to withdraw the complaint after postponement of the meeting for some time in case the Arab efforts being exerted succeed and that al-Sayd also got the Libyan side's agreement to stop the propaganda campaigns within a few days. The Libyan AL-JAMANIRIYAH News Agency has said the al-Qadhdhafi and al-Sayd "discussed the latest developments of the situation in Lebanon and the Israeli attacks against southern Lebanon." [Text] [Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 25 Feb 80 p 1] 8494

CSO: 4802

CNSS DIRECTOR DISCUSSES FUND'S ROLE, MISSION

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 13 Mar 80 p 3

[Article by Mohamed O. Jelledi: "The CNSS Is Determined to Establish Order"]

[Text] We are going to compare the reports of employment and the statements of the employers. Persons claiming family allowances who do not appear in the latter will not be paid. So states Mr Oiga Abdoullaye, Director General of the CNSS [National Social Security Fund] in an exclusive interview with CHAAB.

Mr Oiga Abdoullaye, Director General of the National Social Security Fund, has granted us an exclusive interview in which he set out first of all to define for us the role and mission of his institution.

The first objective of the CNSS, he says, is to ensure salaried workers against a certain number of fortunate or unfortunate eventualities which are of such nature as to reduce or eliminate their capacity to earn a living.

Recalling the measures taken by his institution in the framework of the policy of austerity, Mr Oiga Abdoullaye announced in particular the suspension of payment of family allowances by proxy. He also revealed that, as from this first quarter of the year, there will be a comparison made between the reports of employment made by the employers and the quarterly reports of the workers.

The workers whose names do not appear in the statement of the employer will not be paid.

[Question] Mr Director, for many people the CNSS was created simply to distribute money. Can you tell us precisely the role and mission of the CNSS?

[Answer] The CNSS is an instrument of economic and social development and, in this sense, its first objective in reality is to guarantee the salaried workers against a certain number of fortunate or unfortunate even-

tualities which are of such nature as to reduce or eliminate their capacity to earn a living.

To that end it manages a certain number of systems which include the family allowances, such as the distribution of family allocations, the system of pensions for old age, incapacitating illness, and death, and the system of professional risks: work accidents and professional illness.

Over and above these allowances established by law which the less well-informed know, the Fund, through the expedient of the accumulation of funds which are deposited in banks, constitutes an important factor in the economic development of the country because this is a savings institution. In this regard I think that it is this aspect of the problem which people do not understand very well, because there is no development without investment, and there can be no investments without savings.

The essential role of the Fund in our country should in this sense be understood at all levels.

The CNSS, by the expedient of its health and social action, contributes to subsidizing many organisms with a social purpose.

Thus it is that the Fund has had occasion to participate in special programs of government, such as the national pharmacy office, the Construction and Real Estate Management Company of Mauritania [SOCOGIM], the Public Transport Company of Nouakchott [STPN], and has given subsidies to a certain number of institutions, such as the "Ben Amer" and "Fallah" schools and other organisms, with a view to making up for the inadequacy of health installations of the country. It has contributed to the development of small and medium-size industries, the direction of health programs, and the administration of work which makes an important contribution in preventive activity in the sense of application of rules of hygiene and safety to reduce work accidents.

[Question] In the framework of the policy of austerity, decided on by the CMSN [Military Committee for National Salvation] and the government, the CNSS, like all the State organisms, has adopted important measures. What are these measures? Have they given good results?

[Answer] In the framework of this policy of adjustment the Fund, in matters which concern it, has taken a certain number of measures to check this carefree attitude which has always existed.

The first measure consisted in suspending the payment of family allowances by proxy. I should make it clear at this point that it is not a matter of questioning the legal nature of proxies, but it is simply a provisional measure. However, we have noted many things in daily practice. Certain recipients of benefits gave proxies or did not give them to workers. The latter came to collect the benefits, and very often we had many claims.

Or certain others, perhaps believing that the Fund was stuffed with money, had proxies made for them in the name of a certain number of people who were not working and had them come to collect the allowances.

Also in the case of older people who have retired or persons who have suffered from accidents and who are certainly dead, they continued to make proxies in the name of those people and came to collect the allowances.

Therefore, the Fund wished to suspend payment by proxy for a time and to cease sending allowances in the future except by mail. These results seem satisfactory enough, although we have not yet added up the figures precisely.

What can be noted even so is that the number of children this year, compared to 1978, has gone down by about 3,000.

We do not know yet whether this is the consequence of the measures which we have taken or if that is due to other factors. At the present stage I do not know, but in any case we are in the course of making comparisons to see what is the source of this decline. Beginning in 1980 we have envisaged new measures which I wish to bring to the attention of workers and of employers. In the past the employers were required, like all the rest now, to provide quarterly statements of salaries and deductions.

These declarations have great importance for us, because they contain a certain amount of information. This information is useful for the Fund for the individual problems of workers in terms of their future rights to retirement. Business firms, at times not wishing to pay enough money to the Fund, employ for example 200 workers. However, they make declarations to the Fund and, through these quarterly declarations of salaries and deductions, claim 100. They therefore pay deductions for 100 persons while they employ 200. In the past there was no comparison made between statements of attendance made by the employers and the quarterly statements of salaries to determine in reality whether those for whom they signed these statements worked this year. After this first quarter we will make this comparison, and all those who do not appear in the statement will not be paid.

If, for example, the 100 workers appear in the declaration, even if the employer has not paid up his deductions to the Fund, we will pay these workers. I would like to clarify this notion because it is important. We want to know whether the people who are declared to us are the same people for whom statements have been made, whether the employer is up to date or not. Even if he has declared 100 persons and has not paid the deductions for those people, when he prepares the statements, once they are declared to us, we will pay them. But if we make a comparison and find that these people have not been declared, they will not be paid.

That is also a part of the measures which we have adopted this year. We have undertaken action within the country which has brought us a certain kind of results. However, we have some legislative constraints in that area. We have had to suspend a certain number of pensions and allowances recently. Their financial impact on the management of the Fund is very important. There, to a large extent, are the measures which we have undertaken in that sense. Heads of business firms have undertaken a certain number of promises to us. They involve these allowances, these quarterly statements of salaries and deduction, and the seminar which has been organized by the Ministry of Civil Service and Professional Training. We have had to intervene at this level to sensitize all of the managers of the personnel services of the ministries regarding the need to prepare correctly the forms which they send to the Fund. We have had to make contact at the national level with the Ministry of Finance so that they would send us, for the people paid by the State budget, a list in the form of a State declaration as the employer and on the basis of its information, in order to permit us to know the number of workers paid by the State budget.

We can therefore make the same comparison. That will also permit us to make comparisons with the information which the Treasurer sends us.

At the regional level we have notified the Ministry of the Interior, and I am very happy to say on this occasion that I have already had the reaction of a certain number of governors. The Ministry of the Interior has notified all of the governors asking them, as representing public groups and therefore moral persons distinct from the State, to furnish the quarterly statements of salaries and deductions for the whole of their personnal.

Once again, it is not a matter of people paying us money--that is not the essential question. Certainly, it is important, but it is still more necessary for us to know for whom we are paying that money.

To examine these rights in terms of the Fund, we need to know first if a certain man has been recorded at the Fund and if he has been regularly declared to the Fund, so that we can report the information which we receive every three months in the individual accounts of these workers, in order to determine their future rights to a retirement pension.

But if they pay us money through the Treasurer--the Treasurer pays us, for example, at the end of each month 300,000 UM [Mauritanian ouguiya] for all of the workers in the various regions--we do not know what goes individually to each worker. It would then be very difficult to calculate the pension rights of such a man.

5170
CSO: 4400

QADHDHAFI MUST SHED HIS ILLUSIONS

Rabat L'OPINION in French 10 Mar 80 p 1

[Commentary by Boujemaa Amara]

[Text] Colonel Qadhdhafi is the victim of his own image of himself. He tries to throw himself into the limelight of the international scene at every moment. He believes he has a sacred mission to bring together and reunite the Arab and Muslim worlds. He thinks doubtless with the same conviction that he has the grit and intelligence to do it. His absurd fixed ideas, his suicidal interventions, his deplorable interference, are all explained, if not justified, by such illusions, to which he clings with all his strength. But his initiatives, far from advancing the chimeras on which he feeds generally end in fiasco. And these past failures, rather than tempering Colonel Qadhdhafi and bringing him some maturity, seem to his eyes the very reason to go off half-cocked again. The failures in his African, Arab, and international policy are beyond counting, and Libya's credibility in the chancelleries has thereby been harshly and durably punctured. Both in his statements and in his actions, Colonel Qadhdhafi is the perfect twin of Idi Amin. The Libyan president is obsessed by the mass media. He likes to play simultaneously the buffoon and the star--and on a world stage. This meticulously cultivated masochism is the delight of detractors of the African nation and embarrassing to the prestige of the Arab and Muslim world. Colonel Qadhdhafi loves to be talked about. Well or ill, what does it matter! He makes war on Egypt after furnishing it with Mirages and armaments. He closes the PLO office in Tripolia and offers his own version of Palestinian resistance. The attack on Gafsa, in Tunisia, went awry and exposed Tripoli's direct complicity. Egypt's president permitted himself an indiscretion in speaking of him publicly as the "fool of Tripoli." Regarding Colonel Qadhdhafi it is, at times, difficult to say otherwise. Holding tightly to certitudes which are sheer dogma--except perhaps for the certitude that he is the leader of a nation of bedouins, intoxicated too with the "manna" of oil, scandalized by the moral corruption of others, which he has escaped--alone, you understand--Colonel Qadhdhafi from time to time contemplates the conquest of the Arab and African worlds. He sets about it the wrong way at every chance, and regularly receives ever more crushing defeats. The awkwardness of the Gafsa adventure adds to the already impressive collection of errors of judgment by an Arab leader who resolutely refuses to look at the evidence. Firm in his illusions which, unquestionably, are thick-skinned, the Libyan president is riding alone and on the wrong road. It should be time for him to realize this, in the interest of the cause of which he claims to be apostle and champion.

9516
CSO: [illegible]

ECONOMIC, SOCIAL PROBLEMS REQUIRE REFORMS

Casablanca LAMALIF in French Feb 80 pp 6-8

[Article by Mohamed Ben Messaoud]

[Text] Could a new policy be presently in the making? It would seem so from the way the student problems are being resolved--those problems which the UNEM (National Union of Moroccan Students) pictures as the second phase of "syndical and democratic struggle," after a first phase at the beginning of the academic year which was crowned with success in that the expelled students were reaccepted, enrollments reopened, and the principle of equivalence recognized[1].

On 24 January, UNEM called a strike on the occasion of the national day of struggle for the liberation of political prisoners, the return of exiles, and respect for political liberty--all goals adopted two years ago by Parliament. On 26 January, a new day of strikes was organized, at the request of the PLO, to protest against the implementation of the Camp David accords.

On 25 January, arrests were made in the student quarters, inside buildings and the university premises. The arrested students, UNEM militants, indeed members of its executive committee at almost all institutions, the faculties of medicine and law in Casablanca, the faculties in Fes and Rabat, EMI [expansion unknown], etc....not being released, the student masses unleashed, after the celebrations of Mouloud, new strike movements, notably of 6 and 7 February, at the behest of UNEM, to obtain their release.

The vicious circle was thus begun: new arrests, new strikes, even though the students questioned, like the vice president of UNEM for example, were subsequently released, and it seems that 16 students were kept under preventive arrest.

Reactions varied at different institutions: they ranged from 15 days of general strike to strikes one day out of two with classes held on the alternate day, while some establishments such as Iscae and the Hassania school were closed by the authorities, to the point that there was even talk of

a "blank year" (and the minister for education reminded the UNEM officials of this), while two university canteens in Casablanca and Rabat, and the faculty of medicine in Casablanca, have been on strike for a month.

And whereas a climate of psychosis was developing throughout the university, UNEM in its February 7 press conference denounced the rape of several university institutions and UNEM offices, the ban on meetings, beatings, convocations and lists of posted students, as well as the collaboration of some institutional leadership with the forces of order. On 16 February, students appeared before a Rabat tribunal and were sentenced to prison for several months for "disturbing the peace and constituting an illegal association." On 19 February, the government decided to suspend scholarships for all striking students (80,000 students have scholarships worth 43 billion centimes).

One can question the severity of this governmental policy toward student strikes which are neither rare nor novel and which moreover happen each year at the same time.

For UNEM this reprisal is "part of the general pattern of the present situation, marked by repression, with aggravation of the economic, social and political crisis, the price increases, and the measures taken against labor unions and peasant movements." It emphasizes also that following the 16th Congress, following a 6-year ban, it is trying to restructure itself in order to protect student interests, and that it is in this phase of academic struggle (generalized scholarships, inviolability of university premises, protection of material and moral rights of students, instruction in Arabic, democratized, scientific, and generalized) and the general struggle (liberation of prisoners, institution of an authentic democracy, enlargement of the field of public liberties) that this policy of repression crashes down on them.

Which, according to information coming out of the factional struggle within UNEM, which the revival of the organization and the holding of the 16th Congress were unable to resolve, as hoped. For the recent student elections for corporation office produced results that were frightening to the authorities, who saw therein the beginnings of a purely political agitation, and to the other components of UNEM who saw themselves outstripped.

It is this which explains the Istiqlal party press, after a month of silence on the question, while the official press speaks of a "conspiracy against the country" and "foreign manipulation."

This information about the factional struggle can be set next to the 17 February statement of the UNEM administrative commission "forcefully" condemning the maneuvering within the International Student Union (UIE) to accept "a group of mercenaries under cover of a phantom student organization;" also next to the reference on 7 February in the UNEM president's press conference to the "territorial integrity" of the country.

It can also be set next to the protest of the USFP (Socialist Union of Popular Forces) at the time its Politburo was meeting, on 13 February, against "interference in its affairs," which included an allusion to "repressive and provocative practices" against not only "national and regional officials of the party or mass organizations," but also against "those who disagree with certain provincial party authorities." While emphasizing that "such disagreements are natural within any party whose internal workings rest on the democratic rule," the USFP communique asserts that "no one has the right to substitute himself for the party and its responsible authorities by meddling or interfering."

The real meaning of these statements can be questioned at a time when the situation seems too complex for only the top officials to be accountable. But student movements are not the only feature of the horizon, somewhat appeased as they may be by the minister for education receiving the UNEM (delegation). Social movements have been taking form since the new price increase on fuel and the inflation which followed directly.

One takes note, therefore, of strikes in several areas: mining (OCP), food, textiles; and the CGEM (Moroccan General Economic Federation), the employers' organization, estimates that between December and January there were 80 strikes. The CDT (Democratic Labor Confederation) also organized on 3 February a national day of solidarity with laid-off workers. "There is a social malaise," according to L'OPINION, the Istaqlal's French-language party organ, which as everyone knows is in the government. And its press organs are not the last to emphasize that these strike movements were legitimized by lay-offs, preventive detainings, and lock-outs.

This social malaise born of an extremely difficult economic situation, can only be increased by such bungling as the increase in bus fares in Casablanca and Rabat out of all proportion to the recent fuel increase[2] and which municipal officials demanded be cancelled; the presentation of a bill on rent control for the next session of Parliament which would be even more reactionary than the present law[3]; and the hoarding of certain food products (such as rice) by small and medium sized businesses, denounced recently by the syndicate. One can add the provisions of the finance bill to the same list since it ends up giving security to some but not to others.

But it is difficult to understand how such a situation can motivate the statements of some political officials, notably in the USFP, who complain in the press of the sequestration of student and worker syndicalists, or visible shows of force in front of certain establishments whether or not a strike is going on, of the censoring of its press organs (and of suits brought against them), and of mobilization of the administrative apparatus for "provocations."

Could a remodeling be under way? Some measures would lead one to think so. For example, the creation of a high council of ulemas, presided by the chief of state, and which would meet at least twice a year, and regional councils

in each province. The ulemas would henceforth be responsible for university courses (shari'a, letters, law), enlivening cultural affairs and, in a general way, influencing "daily Moroccan affairs." Announcing this measure, the chief of state insisted on Muslim socialism, on the role of the ulemas in legislating "conformably to doctrine and order," and he insisted on the fact that "Morocco cannot live in contradiction."

But, except for this measure, a new statute is in preparation which would separate administration proper from politics. Some appointments encourage speculation about new redistribution of powers and increased regulation, especially in the countryside, where is seems a new policy is in preparation regarding cooperatives.

Conflicts of duties, powers, personalities, reorganization, adequate designations, this is what seems to be shaping up in this inter-governmental movement which is only just beginning and which could include plans as to the future Parliamentary and commune elections, which may not be held on the scheduled dates.

In view of these signs and above all in view of the repression of the student and social movements, the majority parties are observing the most complete silence (with the exception of one article on the student strikes in L'OPINION of 21 February, and one editorial in LE MATIN DU SHARAR of 24 February raising the specter of "manipulation"[4]), and the opposition parties are asking questions.

USFP, whose parlimentary group has asked for an urgent meeting of the interior committee to examine the situation, says that "the country is on the eve of a new wave of repression" which replaces the "wave of democracy" which it believes to be finished, "in order to hide the inability of the government to meet the real problems which are agitating the Fatherland and the dispossessed masses."

For the USFP press, "Prompt action is required of the government, which is not resigning itself to taking responsibility for failure and taking care of the national debt." It is also hammering on the all-consuming nature of the economic and social situation, the severity of the crisis, the scourage of unemployment, inflation, the decline in purchasing power, and the government's anti-social policy which is described as causing tension and "fearful danger on the internal front."

The USFP is thus preaching a "collective effort to alleviate the ills of Morocco in 1980," and demands "a government which will meet the problems head-on," and concludes that "the solution to the problems is dependent not only on willingness, but also on political courage."

The Politburo of PPS (Party of Progress and Socialism), whose press has recalled the government's promises against inflation, addresses itself above all, in a statement, to the economic crisis and emphasizes "that redress is

mandatory to consolidate the internal front and discourage any hegemonist endeavors." It renews its call on all political forces to conclude a pact of national defense to permit "our Fatherland to emerge victorious from the present trials."

We thus find ourselves facing a situation characterized by repression, attempts at face-lifting, and fear that the "wave of democracy" may be challenged. Now it is precisely over the meaning of this "wave of democracy" that there is disagreement and needs to be understanding. It is clear that for government it is a question of maintaining the status quo (though it is not clear that this must mean the very clear strengthening of a class politics which is evident in all the measures taken).

By contrast, for the opposition, it can only be conceived as an evolutionary process. Thus one of the sides in the present debate opposes obstruction and evolution, and this poses the parallel problem of the preservation of the national consensus, its collapse, or its adaptation to change reinforcing or reducing it.

There is a debate of very ancient origin, one which precedes by a very long time the "wave," or "process," as this period has come to be called, characterized as it is by struggle for the consolidation of territorial integrity.

In light of this debate, the factions observed, the events which characterize it, the contradiction which stains it, the contradictions which it underlies, two facts can be clearly distinguished:

1) the preservation of the status quo is impossible, if only because the economic and social problems are real and demand solutions. Economic recovery and social justice are the main expressions, moreover, which are recognized by all sides. They cannot conceivably be attained without reform, and it is obvious that it is these reforms which will cause problems such as for the budget, as we have seen, fiscal policy yesterday, tomorrow rents, etc...

2) the holding of the internal front is a necessity and consensus on the national question remains the greatest strength of Morocco despite the implications of an international situation in constant and uncertain change.

FOOTNOTES

1. UNEM protested against the exclusion of "repeaters," especially in the science department of Rabat, and limitation of access to the university through the competitive system.

2. The price of fuel went up 15 percent in January; bus fares on 1 February went up from 33 to 116 percent, depending on the length of lines and routes. Because of a new policy tying fares to distance traveled, the inhabitants of the outlying suburbs are doubly penalized and must spend large portions of their earnings (16 percent in some cases, it has been calculated) on transportation.

3. The government project held up by the majority, which rejected the opposition amendments to the text.

4. For Mr A. Alaoui, "Government has obtained explicit proof that the order to strike came from outside." "We are facing," he says, "a campaign of agitation organized and orchestrated from an overseas headquarters and which is obviously a part of that vast organization of subversion and destabilization with which we are familiar." LE MATIN DU SAHARA concludes that the country is threatened by "undermining and conspiracy."

9516
CSO: 4400

MINISTER REVIEWS FINANCIAL POLICY, BUDGET

Rabat L'OPINION in French 1 Mar 80 pp 1, 3

[MAP report: Speech by Finance Minister Abdelkamel Reghaye at a meeting of the Credit and Financial Market Committee, "Let Us Double Our Efforts With a View to Improving Public Finance and Maintaining a Satisfactory Level of Investments and Growth Rate"]

[Text] Appeal to the Banks to Favor the Productive and Export Sectors and, Particularly, the PME [Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises]

Last Thursday, Abdelkamel Reghaye, minister of finance, chaired the proceedings of the 35th meeting of the Credit and Financial Market Committee, held at the seat of the Bank of Morocco, in Rabat.

Opening the meeting, His Highness Prince Moulay El Hassan Ben Mehdi, governor of the Bank of Morocco, delivered a speech welcoming the participants and depicting in succinct terms the country's monetary and economic position.

This was followed by a speech by the minister of finance, as follows:

Your Highness, ladies and gentlemen:

The 35th meeting of the Credit and Financial Market Committee, which I have the pleasure of chairing today, represents, for all of us, an opportunity to draw the balance of the measures we adopted last year and review the general aspects of the fiscal and credit policy we are pursuing this year.

As you know, 1980 will be the final year of the Three-Year Recovery Plan which is essentially aimed at consolidating our gains in the areas of politics and economics, the improvement of the basic balances of our economy, and the pursuit of a social policy and a policy of the management of the territory with a view to achieving an equitable distribution of the results of the growth.

In 1979 the improvement policy launched in 1978 was continued. The measures taken by the authorities, encompassing the overall requirements, aimed at reducing the pressure applied on prices and the balance of payments, yielded appreciable and perceptible results as expressed by the various economic and financial indicators.

The fulfillment of the 1979 state budget was characterized by a slowdown of the growth rate of ordinary expenditures and a substantial monetary increase. This doubly favorable development led to a substantial budgetary surplus totaling 1.3 billion dirhams, as against 600 million dirhams in 1978.

The improvement efforts in the field of state finances have also been reflected in limiting the overall treasury deficit to nearly 7 billion dirhams, despite substantial investments whose volume rose by nearly 29 percent, from 6.6 billion in 1978 to 8.5 billion dirhams in 1979.

In terms of our foreign economic and financial relations, 1979 was marked by a reduction of the current deficit in the balance of payments equaling 12 percent, following a 32 percent reduction in 1978. This development enabled us to substantially lower the need for foreign loans and to limit the overall deficit in the balance of payments to 180 million dirhams.

In the area of fiscal and credit policy, the decisions taken last year and, specifically, credit limitations, made it possible to slow down the monetary circulation and the stabilization of monetary and quasi-monetary funds availability. In 1979 the amount of money in circulation rose by nearly 15 percent, as against nearly 21 percent in 1978. The quasi-monetary rate determined by deposits-imports, showed a substantial increase of 20 percent, thus strengthening monetary savings by the banking system. This favorable development of the money in circulation was paralleled by a distribution of bank credits whose increase remained within the limits stipulated for 1979.

The 1979 production and price results have been equally satisfactory. Actually, despite adverse international circumstances and the heavy expenditures by the state, aimed at securing the defense of our territorial integrity, in both 1978 and 1979 we were able to register a real growth rate of three percent annually.

Furthermore, thanks to a policy of fighting inflation, pursued by the state over the past few years, the increase in the consumer price index was reduced from 12.5 percent in 1977 to 10 percent in 1978 and to nearly 9 percent in 1979. What makes such results even more encouraging is that they were accomplished within a clearly inflationary international context and that most countries experienced far higher price increases.

Your Highness, ladies and gentlemen:

The positive and tangible nature of such results should not lead us to lose sight of the importance of the financial constraints within our economy, constraints which threaten to compromise our long-term growth. That is why we must double our efforts this year, persevering along the way earmarked by the Three-Year Plan.

Thus, in terms of the budget, the finance law for 1980 will extend the policy of improvement of public finances, pursuing a policy of selective austerity on the level of ordinary expenditures and in raising the level of current revenue. On this basis we have mounted a national campaign against fiscal fraud, specifically aimed at recovering income legitimately owed to the treasury and make the taxpayers aware of their fiscal obligations. This campaign is also an effective means for struggle against social disparities, insuring a better distribution of the fiscal burden. The serene climate in which this campaign is developing, and the high feeling of civic responsibility shown by the taxpayers in this case prove that, hence.orth, relations between taxpayers and the administration will be characterized by a positive stage.

The finance law for 1980 equally expresses the desire of the authorities to maintain a satisfactory level of investments and rate of economic growth. It is for this reason that, in addition to fiscal measures aimed at enhancing certain economic sectors, the finance law stipulates substantial equipment approriations totaling 8.4 billion dirhams.

In the area of money and credit, the 1980 policy must remain both cautious and flexible, thus safeguarding the continuation of the effort to recover our internal and external balances while making the adequate financing of economic activities possible.

Indeed, in order to keep overall demand at a level compatible with our output capacity and import possibilities, we must pursue the policy of selective restraint, continued from 1979. In this respect, we have decided to restrict the growth of credit to a level sufficient to meet the real needs of the economy.

The policy we have pursued over the past few years has led to encouraging results, particularly in terms of the inflationary level. However, in order to avoid the adverse effects of a policy of regulation of demand on output and employment, it is important to strengthen our stabilization policy through dynamic action based oon factual demand. A judicious intervention aimed at developing the productive machinery of the national economy would enable us to strengthen the recovery of our basic balances by increasing job possibilities and improving output both for the domestic and export markets.

This is the framework for the activities undertaken by the authorities in the economic and financial areas. Indeed, the public sector is maintaining a satisfactory level of investments affecting the essential features of the productive sectors. Furthermore, through the activities of the specialized financial systems, the state is encouraging the development of productive investments in the key sectors of the national economy.

Such was the case with the BNDE [National Economic Development Bank] and the CIH which increased their investments in 1979 by 39 percent in industry, construction, and hotel management. In turn, the CNCA [National Agricultural Credit Bank] increased its investments in agriculture 18 percent.

This booster role played by the authorities would benefit by the support of the private sector which should be selective in its interventions in order to sustain the economic activity while contributing to the consolidation of our basic balances.

The implementation of this objective greatly depends on the banking sector which, thanks to its widespread ramifications throughout the economy, exerts a decisive influence on the economy in general and the private sector in particular.

Thus, the banks must display greater selectivity, taking into consideration available financial means and avoiding the financing of nonproductive and speculative activities, in general, and of nonessential imports, in particular. Conversely, the banks should double their efforts in promoting the productive sectors of the national economy.

In order to encourage the banking system to follow this way, we have decided to pursue the qualitative flexibility introduced in our policy of credit limits followed over the past few years. Therefore, all credits for the export sector, as well as rediscounted medium-term credits will not be subject to restrictions. The purpose of this measure is to enhance economic activities by facilitating the financing of the sectors boosting the economy. However, in order for this measure to yield the expected results, the banks must display greater dynamism compared with the past, displaying greater interest in such credit categories, the more so since their refinancing by the Bank of Morocco is not subject to any limitations.

As you know, the state spares no efforts to carry out its dynamic mission of promoting growth. In addition to incentives and encouragements directed at private investments, the state has undertaken a broad action which cannot fail to give a new breath to our economy. Thus, in the construction sector, the solution of the financial problems of the ERAC [presumed expansion: Construction Research and Activities

Enterprises], and the drafting of a [illegible] real estate investments and fiscal amendments introduced with the 1980 finance law should not fail to exert a positive influence on the enhancement of this sector which plays the role of a booster of development and whose beneficial impact on economic activities and the housing crisis is undeniable.

On the other hand, the authorities consider particularly important the development of small and medium-sized enterprises which are scheduled to play an ever more important role in the strategy of the country's economic and social development.

Through their facility to adapt to the [illegible] socioeconomic environment and their extensive use of manpower, these enterprises are an important factor in the implementation of governmental policy aimed at reducing economic, social, and regional disparities, on the one hand, and development of job opportunities, on the other.

The state's encouragement given to the boosting of the PME was strengthened by the organization of technical and personnel aid both on the level of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and of the ODI [Office for Industrial Development]. Furthermore, in addition to a simplified financing system organized by the authorities over the past few years, together with the participation of the World Bank, the state has put at the disposal of such enterprises additional financing through the BNDE and the banking system.

The effectiveness of these measures depends on putting at the disposal of the PME adequate financing and the necessary structures for such financing.

That is why the authorities have decided to launch a management program for industrial areas aimed at facilitating the opening of production units. The banks must effectively contribute to this in order to support the state's policy in this area by putting at the disposal of the PME the necessary banking facilities for their development, on the one hand, and participate in financing the management of industrial areas, on the other.

In conclusion, I am convinced that our credit policy, together with the tremendous efforts made by the state, will not fail to encourage the banks to efficiently fulfill their mission in the economic and social development of the country.

I am convinced that the banks, strong through their experience, the competence, and their feeling of responsibility, will fully respond to the guidelines of the authorities in terms of exercising greater selectivity in financing, favoring the productive and exporting sectors and, even more so, the small and medium-sized enterprises. The banks

will thus contribute to the implementation of our basic objectives and contribute to the promotion of economic and social growth and to strengthening the balance of our economy.

Following the speech of the minister of finance and the ratification of the minutes of the 34th meeting of the Credit and Financial Market Committee (CCMF), reports on the following topics were read:

- The development of economic units in 1979 and prospects for the first half of 1980;

- The development of monetary circulation and of its counterparts in 1979;

- The development of credits and bank holdings in 1979;

- The balance of payments; 1979 results and 1980 prospects;

- The cereal crop 1979-1980 campaign--marketing and imports;

- Estimates of credits needed by the economy for 1980 and report on the meetings of the select commission of the CCMF.

At the end of the meeting, Abdelkamel Reghaye addressed a message to His Majesty King Hassan II expressing the congratulations of the participants to the Sovereign on the occasion of the Throne Celebration, as well as their loyalty to His Majesty the King.

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LOCAL ENERGY SOURCES TO BE FURTHER DEVELOPED

Rabat L'OPINION in French 27 Feb 80 pp 1-2

[MAP Report]

[Text] On the basis of promising indicators, Morocco has decided to increase petroleum prospecting in the future, according to TELEX MEDITERRANEE, the economic information semi-monthly. Actually, whereas Moroccan petroleum production totaled 24,350 tons in 1978, higher compared with the previous year (22,000 tons), nevertheless, it accounts for no more than 0.6 percent of Morocco's requirements. The bill for petroleum imports to be met by Morocco is, consequently, quite stiff.

Thus, the cost of petroleum rose from 226 million dirhams in 1973 to over 1 billion 253 million dirhams (over 454 percent) in 1978, corresponding to respective amounts of 2 million 261,687 tons and 2 million 872,440 tons (over 27 percent). In 1978 it accounted for 2.4 percent of the gross national product, as against 0.9 percent which is the global average.

On the level of imports, the average annual growth rate between 1973 and 1978 was 5.4 percent in tonnage as against 90.5 percent in cost caused by price increases.

With a view to reducing this dependence on the outside, Morocco hopes to develop its own energy resources on the basis of existing potential. The cost of this three-year program for the development of energy resources will be 3 billion 624 million dirhams.

The directions to be followed will be:

Petroleum: Petroleum prospecting in the Essaouira area where promising indicators exist. The overall cost of the project for the three-year period will be 331 million dirhams.

Bituminous shale: Study of the possibility to build a thermoelectric power plant operating on bituminous shale. Such a plant, based on an

experimental unit generating 250 megawatts, would make it possible to test under normal operational conditions the possibility for the self-ignition of Timahdit shale. An appropriation of 100 million dirhams has been planned for the 1980 fiscal year for such a unit, for preliminary studies for petroleum extraction through pyrolysis from bituminous shale; in 1980 30 million dirhams will be appropriated for such studies.

Solar energy: In the course of this three-year program a solar energy center will be built in Marrakech with a view to promoting the use of solar power in the country, together with studies of a hydrosolar plan, and a study of coal mining.

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DEVELOPMENT OFFICIAL REVIEWS INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 3 Mar 80 p 3

[MAP interview with Mohamed Belkhayat, director general of the Industrial Development Office (ODI)]

[Text] "Moroccan industrial policy is characterized by its realism and its opening to the outside," stated last Saturday, Mohamed Belkhayat, director general of the Industrial Development Office.

Interviewed by the Maghreb-Arabe-Presse Agency (MAP), on the occasion of the "Days of Promotion of Industrial Investments in Morocco," held in Rabat from 25 to 29 February, Belkhayat emphasized that Morocco has developed a firm and specific industrial strategy based on the following:

The development of phosphates through the extension of the Maroc-Chimie complex and the development of Maroc-Phosphore I and II, with the construction of other similar units planned;

The development and implementation of a sugar manufacturing plan which has made it possible to build about a dozen sugar refineries and the production of two-thirds of the national requirements, until 90 percent of national requirements have been reached;

Action on the level of the cement and construction materials sectors which made it possible to reach an output of 4.5 million tons in 1979 compared with only one million tons in 1960.

Furthermore, the cement manufacturing plan calls for a production capacity for eight million tons by 1985-1986. "Such activities have already yielded results, since our country will not be importing cement in 1980;"

The development of textile industries: actually, Morocco which, in 1969 imported virtually all its textiles, currently meets all of its domestic requirements and is exporting about 800 million dirhams' worth of such goods.

All in all, the national industry is meeting the need of the country for large consumption products, the ODI director general emphasized. Nevertheless, he noted that Morocco has engaged in the production of semifinished products in the machine, electronics, and plastics sectors (whose output has been increasing by 15 percent per year as of 1965), and of metallurgical output (including the current construction of the Nador complex).

The share of industrialization in gross domestic production rose from 12 percent in 1979 [sic] to 18 percent in 1979, pointed out Belkhayat, who added that the annual growth rate of industrial exports has averaged 18 percent and that the number of industrial projects completed annually, from 100 to 150 before 1972, has risen currently to 600-650. This proves the tremendous effort launched by the government of His Majesty the King in the industrial area.

Asked about the results of the Days of Promotion of Moroccan Industrial Investments, Belkhayat emphasized the psychological impact of this forum which involved the high level participation of over 300 international companies representing 32 countries. This, he said, made it possible to eliminate the wait-and-see attitude of the promoters and thus to create an emulation climate benefiting Morocco's economic development.

The basic agreement on the implementation of 24 projects has been concluded. Furthermore, one-third of these projects was suggested by the participants themselves, and the impact of this meeting will not be limited to the level of the participants. Other foreign promoters will invest in Morocco, he emphasized.

Consequently, this forum will have international reverberations.

Questioned on the role of the ODI in the development of small and medium-sized enterprises (PME), Belkhayat recalled the creation of a unit within the establishment aimed at providing help and assistance to PME who may request them.

This unit consists of a team of specialized personnel and experts from the European Economic Community (EEC). Its purpose is to examine on the spot the problems of the PME and help to resolve them. This unit, also represented within the technical committee, where it deals with the PME files, is operating on a voluntary basis.

On the subject of the current situation of the PME, the ODI director general specified that the PME are easily adapting themselves to the circumstances: They are not only operating but developing. "It is precisely thanks to their dynamism that we have been able to preserve

jobs in some sectors." Actually, he added, the measures aimed at lowering our imports have specifically benefited the PME. "Thus, the PME are developing and the state is encouraging their development."

Finally, asked about the development of Arab investments in Morocco, the ODI director general emphasized the importance of the participation of Arab businessmen in this forum which proved the interest they show in our economy. "It is, therefore, necessary to organize an awareness campaign to encourage them to invest more in other sectors of Morocco's industry," Belkhayat concluded.

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NEW PORT COMPLEX TO BE BUILT AT LAAYOUNE

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 1-2 Mar 80 pp 1, 2

[MAP report: "Fishing Port in Laayoune: Technical Data"]

[Excerpts] Rabat, 1 March. A new link in the Moroccan port infrastructure will be completed in the next few years on the coast close to the city of Laayoune, following the construction of a port neighboring the current maritime installations of Port Fos-Bucraa, with which it will form a single port complex located some 25 kilometers southwest of the capital of the regained Sahara provinces.

This operation, which will be one of the biggest on the Moroccan Atlantic coast, was marked by the signing of an agreement, Friday afternoon, between the Ministry of Equipment and National Development and the Dutch company Royal Boss Kalis Westminster which specializes in international construction.

The agreement was signed by M'Hamed Douiri, minister of equipment and national development, and L. A. R. Sandbergen, director general of the Dutch company.

When completed, the new port will total 3,200 linear meters of piers and dikes between 0 and -10 hydrographic; 1,800 linear meters of wharfs between -6 and -7 hydrographic, 150 hectares of landfills, ship repair installations, stores, purification systems, refrigeration facilities, water mains, lights, etc.

The first section will include the following:

- 3,200 linear meters of jetties and dikes;
- 1,000 linear meters of piers;
- 30 hectares of landfills;
- One hauling-slip, whose construction is to be undertaken immediately.

This first section, supplied with superstructures, will handle over 200,000 tons of fish per year in addition to 300,000 tons per year of various merchandise (grain, fuel, construction materials, and others).

When completed, the Laayoune port will make it possible to handle 300,000 tons of fish and 500,000 tons of various merchandise per year (currently Agadir handles 220,000 tons of fish and 600,000 tons of various merchandise and minerals per year).

Sea water treatment installations will be built within the port area.

A new city will develop around the new port of Laayoune, similar to what will happen at the Tan-Tan port, also located 25 kilometers away from the city of Tan-Tan.

The new Laayoune port will be part of the chain of fishing and coastal navigation ports planned between Agadir and Lagouira.

The ports to be completed in the immediate future will be those of Sidi Ifni and Boujdour.

The construction of the first section of the new port, recently assessed at approximately 210 million dirhams, is to be undertaken in the immediate future and will take about 30 months. Following the completion, fishing and coastal navigation ships will be able to use the very good facilities offered by the port.

The construction of superstructural projects will be undertaken at the end of 1982.

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PHOSPHATES PRODUCTION EXPANSION PLANS REVIEWED

Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 29 Feb 80 pp 1, 4

[Unattributed report]

[Excerpts] The OCP [Office Cherifien des Phosphates] group, the first Moroccan enterprise, is also one of the biggest on the African continent. The share of its exports in the international phosphate trade--over one-third of total world exports--makes our country first in this area, ahead of the United States and the USSR.

The purpose of the program is to enable the OCP group to eventually become the leading world producer and, in the first stage, to use domestically 30 percent of the extracted mineral. It is within this context of the country's regional development efforts that the plan for increasing mineral exploitation is being implemented in accordance with the following stipulations:

Extraction Capacity Reaching 23 Million Tons

The current extraction capacity is 16 million tons per year. It could be increased in a few months following the completion of strip mining facilities.

The installation of two new extraction units is underway. This will increase the area's capacity by eight million tons per year. The current processing capacity is 19 million tons per year. A complex for maintenance, storage, and drying facilities for four million tons per year is being built in Oued-Zem. This will raise the handling capacity of the installation to 23 million tons per year.

Sidi Hajjaj: Completion Scheduled for 1984

The commissioning of the Sidi Hajjaj deposits will represent a very important development center, bearing in mind proven reserves and

above all, the quality of the mineral. Production for export will be initiated in 1984: The planned capacity is three million tons per year in the first stage and, subsequently, raised to [illegible] million tons per year.

Four Million Tons of Black Phosphates in Yussoufia

In Yussoufia the annual extraction capacity is six million tons per year. Drying and calcinating capacities for "black phosphate" are, respectively, six million tons and 500,000 tons per year.

The projects underway will make it possible to progressively raise the output of calcinated black phosphate, 75 percent BPL, to 4 million tons per year.

Benguerir Will Produce 10 Million Tons Per Year

A new mining zone has been opened in Benguerir. The first section which will supply two million tons per year to Maroc Phosphore II, was commissioned in the third quarter of 1979. The area will progressively increase its output, eventually reaching 10 million tons per year; the surplus tonnage will be hauled to Jorf Lasfar.

Geological surveys have entered their active stage which will be expanded.

The Meskala

The Meskala area will be equipped so that it may gradually reach an annual production capacity of 10 million tons. Chemical units are also planned for the Cap Sim area.

Bou Craa

Its output capacity is six million tons. The current Boucraa-Laayoune handling installations can provide transportation for 10 million tons of phosphates from the mine to the treatment plant; the development of this area will make it possible to reach this capacity.

The Jorf Lasfar Plan

The plan for the expansion of the OCF aims not only at increasing the productivity of the deposits but at consolidating the various activities, marketing, industrialization, and the social policy of the office. One of the most important among them is the marketing of the phosphates. That is why the construction of a big chemical complex has been planned at Jorf Lasfar, located midway between Casablanca and Safi. Its initial stage (1983-1985) will include the following:

A "Maroc-Phosphore III" unit with a 4,000 ton daily capacity of P 205, starting with the mineral in Khouribga; production will be undertaken in 1983 and the construction will be completed in 1985;

A DAP and NPK unit, for domestic agriculture and exports;

A treatment and drying unit for the phosphate coming from Sidi-Hajjaj, with a three million tons per year capacity;

All the necessary port facilities for exporting the mineral and the acid, and for importing sulfur and ammonia.

Thanks to these industrial units of Maroc-Chimie I and II, and Maroc-Phosphore I, at the present time the OCP group already has one of the most important and modern industrial complexes in the world for the production of phosphoric acid.

Therefore, the completion of the Chemical Complex in Jorf Lasfar will mark a new stage in Morocco's development and diversification of output.

The current capacity for the production of phosphoric acid at the Safi units is 850,000 tons of P 205. Following the fourth line of Maroc-Phosphore I and the plant at Maroc Phosphore II under construction, the capacity will reach 1.5 million tons of P 205 as of the second half of 1980.

Uranium

Furthermore, the gradual development of units for the extraction of uranium contained in the phosphoric acid produced in Safi and Jorf Lasfar has been planned. The first unit will be commissioned in Safi in 1983.

Fertilizers

To meet the needs of the country for the stockpiling and conditioning of the fertilizers, the OCP group will continue the implementation of its program by building 10 new units in different parts of the country to meet our agricultural requirements.

Thus, deliveries will be increased from 600,000 tons for the 1979-1980 campaign to 1 million 250,000 tons for the 1984-1985 campaign.

Ports

It is obvious that transportation, both in terms of imports and exports, plays a decisive role in the activities of the OCP group. We know the

importance of phosphate goods in terms of rail and maritime transportation. In this respect, as far as maritime haulage is concerned, exports of the products of the OCP group will be insured by five ports: Casablanca, Jorf Lasfar, Safi, Essaouira, and Laayoune.

Currently the Casablanca port could handle from 18 to 20 million tons of phosphates annually.

Currently the port facilities in Safi could handle exports of 10 to 12 million tons of phosphates per year as acid or fertilizer.

The Laayoune port, considering its current facilities, allows the export of 1? million tons of phosphate per year.

Bearing in mind the fast increase in the exports of phosphates and phosphoric acid in the next few years, the building of the new port in Jorf Lasfar is actively underway. This port will handle from 80,000 to 100,000 tons of minerals and will be connected with the mining areas of Khouribga and Sidi Hajjaj, in its initial stage, and the Yussoufia and Benguerir deposits in the second stage.

New Port in Cap Sim

The building of a port at Cap Sim (Essaouira Province) is being studied. Its construction will be undertaken following the completion of the port works of Jorf Lasfar.

Marphocean

Furthermore, for the sake of developing its transportation facilities, the OCP group has acquired, through its Marphocean branch six phosphorus-hauling ships totaling 10?,400 tons. This fleet will be expanded by the acquisition of several ships four of which will be the first part of a program for the outfitting of 10 ships, raising the hauling capacity to 161,600 tons.

On a parallel basis, three new ships will be added to the COMANAV fleet used to haul OCP phosphate.

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BRIEFS

STUDENT SENTENCES--Rabat, 24 February (MAP). Last Saturday morning the Rabat Court of First Instance passed its sentence in the case of the "disturbances of the public order and the organization of an illegal association." Two students were sentenced to six months in jail and a fine of 300 dirhams. Another was sentenced to four months in jail and a fine of 200 dirhams; seven others were sentence to three months in jail and a fine of 150 dirhams each. They were prosecuted in accordance with the stipulations of articles 288, 291, 278, 141, 146, and 149 of the Penal Procedure Code. The sentencing was twice postponed for a week, for consideration by the court following the trial held on 1 February last. "Ila At Amam" was an illegal Marxist-Leninist leaning organization for whose organization they were prosecuted. [Text] [Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 25 Feb 80 p 2] 5157

APPEAL FOR DETAINEES' AMNESTY--We have received the following statement: "In Morocco, behind the facade of tourist slogans and official propaganda hides a prison for crimes of opinion, speech, assembly, or association. Hundreds of men and women are deprived of freedom and most basic medical care, which leads to their physical harm, as severe as it is irreversible. We, the undersigned, on behalf of human rights--as recorded in the Moroccan constitution--demand a general amnesty which will lead to the release of all political prisoners and the return of exiles." This text was signed by Mohamed Bensaid, Mahomed Harbi, Max-Pol Fouchet, Lionel Jospin, Huguette Bouchardeau, Costa-Gavras, Simone de Beauvoir, Alain Bouc, Claude Bourdet, Alain Chesnal, Adib Dimitri, Guy Hennebelle, Yves Lebas, Lucien Praire, Hussein Zahoune. Those wishing to join this appeal may send their signatures to Mr Devouge, 5 Rue des Envierges, 75020 Paris. [Text] [Paris LE MONDE in French 9 Mar 80 p 3] 5157

CSO: 4400

DISPUTE OVER HAWAR ISLANDS DISCUSSED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 17-23 Mar 80 p 25

[Article by 'Ali Hashim]

[Text] At a time when the nations of the Arabian Gulf are trying to overlook the animosities and regional disputes among themselves, the dispute between Qatar and Bahrain over the Hawar island group, to which both countries claim possession, is suddenly flaring up again.

The story began with an "innocent" statement which Bahraini Minister of Development and Industry Yusuf al-Shirawi made about a new plan which his government had authorized, providing that that government should assume the responsibility for petroleum prospecting at its own expense instead of conceding it to foreign companies, which take one-half of the production after discovery. After referring to the areas which are now subject to new operations of exploration, he mentioned casually that his government will demand in advance the modification of the conditions of the petroleum prospecting concession in the islands of Hawar and al-Maynuh to a group of U.S. companies!

The statement went unchallenged for a week, and then suddenly Qatari Minister of Petroleum Shaykh 'Abd-al-'Aziz ibn Khalifah Al Thani, son of the ruler of Qatar, issued a strong response to it.

In the statement, 'Abd-al-'Aziz reproached al-Shirawi's behavior in treating the Hawar islands as though they were the private property of Bahrain. He said that those islands were one hundred percent Qatari, both geographically and historically, in spite of the British decision which gave them to Bahrain with the stroke of a pen in 1937.

He added that that behavior with regard to the islands was irresponsible, because they are Qatari islands, and Saudi Arabia would settle the dispute over them in an attempt to arbitrate.

The story of the Hawar islands is an old one which left many ill feelings between Qatar and Bahrain before the British withdrew and independence was declared.

Bahrain's retention of the Hawar islands goes back about 200 years, when the Khalifah family emigrated from the Arabian Peninsula and settled for a time in the area of Zubarah in the northern part of the Qatar Peninsula, where they established an amirate and behaved as invaders in the area. Some families, such as the al-Zayyani family of about 1,000 persons, left in company with them, and they went from al-Zubarah to Bahrain, took possession of it, and established their amirate, which they have ruled till the present time.

Bahrain insists that it owns the Hawar islands, and demands, albeit in a whisper, the area of al-Zubarah for tribal and historic reasons. This dispute has stirred up animosities between Qatar and Bahrain, especially between the two ruling families, Al Thani and Al Khalifah. The nations of the Gulf have mediated between Doha and al-Manama, and the demand for al-Zubarah has diminished. However, the issue of the Hawar islands persisted till Saudi Arabia was able to persuade the two nations to accept its mediation in the dispute.

For the past 7 years, Qatar has refrained from mentioning the dispute either directly or indirectly, kept mention of it out of the news media, and confiscated non-Qatari newspapers which wrote on the subject.

Qatar has always treated the dispute as one between brothers and assumed that it would come to an end after reasonable arbitration and a return to the reality of the Gulf.

In the Qatari response, and in the special councils, Bahrain's demand for al-Zubarah and Hawar is not logical, because a tribe's passage over a particular area, settling down in it for several years, and then migrating from it does not give it the historic right to take possession of that area; otherwise, many actualities would be lost and the world would be in chaos. Many nations have raided, occupied, and settled numerous areas in the world fsr hundreds of years, but does this temporary occupation give them the right to permanent possession?

Have the Arabs the right, for example, to demand Spain, southern France, Sicily, Crete, Iran, and India after going there and staying for a long time?

When the Qatari response reaches the hearing of the concerned parties in Bahrain, they don't give a clear answer to it, but it is understood that there are hidden motives which lead this nation or that to hang on to the island group.

Observers know that the dispute between Qatar and Bahrain is not a historical dispute, but a geographic one.

The Hawar islands lie just off the Qatari shore, and any Qatari can traverse the distance to them on foot, because the waters which separate them

from the shore are shallow and do not necessitate swimming or going by boat. On this basis, they lie within the territory and in the territorial waters of Qatar, for the distance between Hawar and Bahrain cannot be compared to the distance between Hawar and Qatar.

A historical view gives Qatar the right to the ownership of the islands. The inhabitants of Qatar used them through the years for fishing till the British came along and played the game by which they still keep the area in subjection -- that is, they surveyed to their own taste. They intruded the boundary of the amirate of Abu-Dhabi into the territory of the Sultanate of Oman and the boundary of Umm al-Qaywayn into Sharjah, and certain territory belonging to Sharjah and extending as far as the amirate of al-Fujayrah into the Sultanate of Oman, and likewise treated the boundary between the amirate of Ra's al-Khaymah and the Sultanate of Oman as if it were a crossword puzzle. And the story ran similarly with Qatar and Bahrain, for the British issued a ruling in 1937 giving the possession of the Hawar islands to Bahrain. The Qataris did not accept the fait accompli at that time, but the game of territories and boundaries was not important in the 1930's, because the land was extensive and the sea was vast, and the inhabitants were few, and there was no foreknowledge of mineral or petroleum resources.

Now the game has changed: petroleum has become the ruler of rulers and of rules.

Thus Bahrain kept matters, at the disposal of the minister al-Shirawi himself, who gave the concession for prospecting operations to a group of U.S. companies.

At this point, Qatar had to speak its piece. The Qatari minister of finance and petroleum declared his country's ownership of the island group and declared that he reserved the right to assign concessions and the right to petroleum if it should be found in marketable quantities there.

The Arabian Gulf, in which others than they are active now, has been made more active by Hawar.

Highly placed sources in the Gulf say that Saudi Arabia's initiative, with Kuwaiti support, may now be moving toward taking charge of the consequences and developments in the dispute.

They add that there has been a trend toward holding a tripartite summit conference of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Bahrain to reach a solution.

One of the proposed solutions is guaranteeing to Qatar the right of ownership of the islands, on condition that whatever petroleum is found there should be shared equally between the two nations.

So, whenever the Gulf heals one wound, another appears.

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

MIG-25, -27 PURCHASE--According to sources near the Syrian government, negotiations are now underway with Moscow for the purchase of some additional MiG-25s and MiG-27s. It seems that Syria desires to provide itself with a more sophisticated version of the Foxbat since the MiG-25s now in use, equipped with a simplified "export" avionics package, are reportedly not up to the expectations of the Syrian Air Force general staff. [Text] [Paris LE MONITEUR DE L'AERONAUTIQUE in French Apr 80 p 9].

CSO: 4800

REACTION TO POLITICAL BUREAU DECISIONS REPORTED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 11 Mar 80 p 4

[Text] Following the decisions made by the PSD [Destourian Socialist Party] Political Bureau during its last meeting chaired by the head of state, the TAP agency received a statement signed by Mrs Radhia Haddad and Messrs Beji Caid Essebsi, Mohamed Amara, Hassib Ben Ammar, Sadok Ben Jemaa and Mohamed Salah Belhaj which read:

"President Bourguiba, with the audacity which has always characterized his actions, has just taken the initiative to repeal the decision which excludes militants who have remained faithful to their publicly stated position and the struggle for the country's integrity.

Affecting a group which for the past 10 years has continually demanded the democratization of the government, this gesture assumes great psychological importance to the extent that it lifts the ban on men in power so they can engage in a fruitful dialogue about the future of the country.

We believe that this gesture could start a process to lead the country to a true democratization which will benefit all citizens devoted to the independence and progress of Tunisia."

For his part, Mr Habib Boulares sent TAP agency the following statement:

"President Bourguiba, with the audacity which has always characterized his actions, has taken the initiative to repeal the decision which excludes the militants who have in no way abandoned their publicly stated positions. Affecting a group which for the past 10 years has continually demanded the democratization of the government, the gesture made toward them has a great psychological importance to the extent that it lifts the ban which prevented men in power from engaging in a fruitful dialogue with those individuals excluded in the past. It could begin a process leading Tunisia to a true democratization which will benefit all citizens devoted to the country's independence."

For his part, in a statement to the press agencies reported by AFP last Saturday, Mr Mestiri, who acted solely in his name and in that of one of his political friends, Mr Mohamed Moada, indicated that while appreciating at "its true worth" this gesture which apparently stems from "good intentions, we think, however, that it does not basically modify the essence of the problems currently facing the country."

Mr Mestiri mentioned again, about this matter, the statement he made on 6 March 1980 after a meeting with President Bourguiba, a statement stressing "the need to draw up a complete, sincere evaluation of the situation and then to proceed with substantive, indispensable changes responsive to the aspirations of the Tunisian people and the needs of the future."

9479
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UNIVERSITY CRISIS REVEALED, JUSTIFIED

Tunis DIALOGUE in French 10 Mar 80 pp 48-49

[Article by Naceur Ben Cheikh: "University Crises: A Necessary Evil?"]

[Text] The young Tunisian university is in crisis. Everyone knows that. In the commonly used sense, the notion of crisis designates "a difficult period in the life of a society or even an institution, a tense situation which must be resolved to permit a return to the normal state." This definition from Larousse reflects a certain vision of the world which was taken into consideration, to a great extent, in establishing modern Arab universities. This is a reference which places the discourse on crisis in a specific, particular context--that of western, so-called classical thought which in operation accommodates itself well to the notion of crisis. It could even be said that it lives with it. Contrary to those who only consider the great moments in the history of the western university, it is based primarily on a precarious balance of thought which has always hidden the crisis that it encourages by being always in the middle and beyond the impassioned, conflicting ideological currents affecting the political and social field. The university is thus situated outside the real world, considered a neutral, autonomous space, a place of arbitration, of rational judgment and conciliation, a place of true knowledge, freed from the contingencies of current history. However, good sense tells us that in spite of itself, this institution is situated in historical reality and is a product of it. This idyllic discourse has always been maintained and justified by its practical translation into what is real, through an academic process whose victim has been the discourse on knowledge which allows for discovery because it does not claim to be the truth.

Now, we note that this western university which breeds knowledge can only assure its functioning by claiming, even for a time, scientific truth. When a person or even an institution begins to take itself seriously by announcing that it possesses scientific truth, this is the most obvious sign of its degeneration; in other words, its obsolescence. Listen to Condillac speak to us of the university of his time: "I do not claim that the manner of teaching is as imperfect as during the 13th century.

The scholastics have stopped making some mistakes, but imperceptibly and in spite of themselves. Bound up in their routine, they insist on what they still have and, with the same passion, they insisted on what they gave up. They did battle so they would lose nothing; they would continue to fight for what they had not lost. They still do not notice the ground they were forced to give up. The universities are old and they have the defect of age: I mean they are not inclined to correct themselves. Can one presume that professors will give up what they believe in order to learn what they do not know?" (Course of Studies, "Modern History", Volume 2, pages 235-236).

From this long quotation by Condillac referred to by J. Derrida, we stress that the universities are not inclined to correct themselves. This is not a problem of age, but of the nature of the function, which in the context of rationalist, scientific thought can only be carried out in the resigned concealment of the internal conflicts affecting it--those which are designated as being the source of the crises which regularly shake it, thus causing the necessary revitalization of knowledge to occur in the violence of the struggle between the new and the old.

This mode of rationalist reflection, based on hiding conflicts, is in the same domain as another, also scientific mode which presents itself as surpassing the first. This one not only acknowledges the existence of internal conflict but even exhibits it and accepts it as the very source of progress. This discourse is designated under the pompous title of dialectical thought and is qualified by other adjectives like materialist and historic. This thought goes as far as legitimizing the crisis by making it a necessity. By adopting this viewpoint, some even wish to aggravate the crisis, so it can ultimately be resolved as soon as possible. Others, more in a hurry and who consider themselves more committed in the historic sense, will act or militate to precipitate the crisis of the system they would like to see disappear, in order to establish a new order, a New Order.

Thus, there is a sort of fundamental complicity between those who accept and adjust well to the crisis and those who desire it and even provoke it. From these convergent viewpoints, the crisis of the university is considered a necessary evil, a sort of growth-related illness, a fever which allows for the passage from one age to another. It is the normal manifestation of the contradictions which are the very texture of all living reality. For the two, contradiction is confused with the notion of conflict and the next stage, with negation. For that reason, both view the crisis as a sign of social progress. According to the first, they see in it the very proof of evolution and they feel they are its objects; for the second, the crisis announces the normal evolution of a process which should be allowed to happen and occasionally, be encouraged. The latter always think that time is on their side and they rejoice at each increase in temperature, at the slightest increase that they can record.

From these two converging viewpoints, this logical explanation of the crisis is presented as being scientific. Indeed, it is, from the moment that we consider that only rigorous scientific thought comes from the natural sciences. This both justifies and is the basis for the fact that the university crisis is treated as one treats a sick body; one seeks to cure, or rather help it recover an equilibrium that it lost and never had. Thus, one proceeds scientifically, calmly, cautiously, objectively, by taking the passion out of the debate. The method is clearly indicated: the sociologists who specialize in investigations and content analyses gather together the objective facts which they are going to deduce from concrete reality. By discussing this information, one will reach conclusions, in the form of objective reports. These reports will allow politics (considered here as the main subject) (incumbent or opposition power) to measure the degree of tension and make the necessary decisions. It can happen that the sociologist-expert who makes the investigation can be tempted, and this is normal, by the idea of pursuing the reasoning to the limits, leaving his sector in the social division of labor, to insert himself into politics. He continues his investigation by drawing the necessary conclusions (read decisions.) From the standpoint of reason, no one can criticize him. After all, no one has ever prevented--quite the contrary--a doctor from pointing out remedies and recommending them to his patient. One even goes so far as to speak of his moral power to administer the medicine which he deems scientifically necessary.

It is in the name of scientific thought itself which rationalizes work by dividing it, logic which underlies both the explanation of the world through the philosophic discourse of the subject, the scientific method of the biologist, the chemist, the physicist and the sociologist, that of the means to transform it from the political viewpoint, that this logic is that of a knowing subject who places himself outside the real world, beyond himself, at a distance to dominate and understand it better. The very basis of the method is to act as a disinterested, objective observer. Now, one can only do it by making a distinction which contradicts common good sense, between the reality of this observer who is situated organically in the whole of the real world and his functional status which obliges him to deny it. That is the problem of all activity about human knowledge which implies that, to understand what is real, one must leave it, hide it. To achieve that, however, one can only project above the structure of necessarily abstract reason, which is none other than that of the method. However, what is swept aside in this logic of scientific objectivity is the knowledge or reason by reason itself. In other words, the method is practical, profitable and economical, but it can only remain so by ignoring itself and its very limits. Its renewal then is imposed by the needs of the whole which encompass it, too. Thus, while claiming to knowledge of its subjects, it finds itself unprepared to face anomalies which it discovers, or even encourages by becoming adjusted to them, by considering them a necessary

evil. From this viewpoint, these anomalies are called economic, social or university crises.

It is evident from this evaluation that as long as the rationalist and only rationalist university model is perpetuated, one can only record the crises or even treat them by the discourse of neutralization, placing the university space outside the real world and protecting it against the ideologies of power in the real world. Under current conditions, the crisis can only be treated from the dominating rationalist viewpoint by considering the university as a place which guarantees the renewal of society, not its reproduction. In other words, by no longer considering it as an institution directly linked to the economy, politics and knowledge of the moment, no longer subject to the laws of profitability, by supressing the relationship of domination which is the source of the crises. Because, as one has just seen, there is a methodological solidarity between the oppressive claim to knowledge and method, the cadre attitude of most university professors toward students, the presence of the discourse on power (the incumbent and its equivalent, the opposition), the transformation of the university into a place of conflicts and confrontations and relationships of strength which quickly are transformed into violent clashes and the presence of law enforcement forces. All these interdependent elements can only strengthen and nourish that which feeds on the very nature of the discourse on violence--intellectual, methodological as well as that which, to restore order, only increases the tension and weakens that which guarantees the survival of this particular institution whose task is to make possible a leap beyond the present, not its negation or even its confirmation. When one is concerned about the future, one can only be open to it.

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ENERGY CONSUMPTION, CONSERVATION, ALTERNATES OUTLINED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 8, 11 Mar 80

[Article: "Search for Energy Sources To Be Kept Up"]

[8 Mar 80, p 2]

[Text] At the beginning of this new decade, the world's energy situation looks increasingly worrisome as production and consumption take opposite directions.

In Tunisia, 1979 could prove to be one of the best years as far as energy production is concerned.

Thus, even if, for 1980, every measure was taken to keep crude oil surplus stocks at their 5.5 million-ton level, this surplus is decreasing due to increased demand.

What, then, is the future perspective for the decade of the eighties?

Crude oil production in 1979 surpassed 5.5 million tons (5.57 million), that is an increase of 12.5 percent in relation to 1978.

For the current year, every measure has been taken to maintain output at the level of 5.5 million tons.

As of today, the mining sector has 20 permits to search and exploit hydrocarbons totalling almost 131,000 km^2 and covering most of the continental plateau.

Already since the beginning of the year, the Tunisian Petroleum Activities Enterprise [ETAP] in association with foreign companies has applied for four permits. These four permits are therefore being processed. Thus, the search effort undertaken several years ago remains extensive. If, in 1978, 28 wells were drilled, in 1979 the number reached 35, an increase of 25 percent. Investments at this level will have reached in 1979 (the figure is not definitive) 59 million dinars. This figure, in all probability, will reach the neighborhood of 74 million dinars in 1980, an increase of 34.5 percent.

How is the 1979 production distributed? The d'El Borma oil field produced 2.85 million tons, Ashtart 2.406 million tons, Sidi Latayem 202,000 tons, Douleb Tamesmida 89,000 tons and Chouech-Salida (south of d'El Borma) 38,000 tons.

As far as natural gas in concerned, production reached 330 million m^3 (El-Borma: 327 millions and Sidj Abderrahmane au Cap Bon: 3 millions). The d'El Borma gas feeds the STEG [Tunisian Gas and Electric Company] thermal power plant at Gabes as well as some large industries operating with gas (ICM [Maghreb Chemical Industries], cement plant, construction materials). This figure probably will be maintained.

New Discoveries?

Three oil fields were discovered in 1979 and another one in the current year. The first one, chronologically and in importance, was discovered in July 1979. It is "Tazarka" which has shown a satisfactory index during appraisal and involves the "Golfe Hammamet Grands Fonds" permit. The second oil field, "Sabria-Nord" concerns the Medenine permit and became prominent in August 1979.

A detailed seismic study is in process. It will serve to determine the site for establishing a second well which is necessary to demarcate the structure and evaluate its extent.

"Larich," discovered in October 1979 in the south permit, is the third and last field discovered during the past year. Here, tests carried out on the only well drilled up to now, even if yielding more than encouraging results, must of necessity be followed by further measurements, including the drilling of at least a second well.

"Makhrouga," the fourth oil field, dates only from January 1980. It is also situated within the south permit. Here too production tests seem conclusive but by themselves do not permit taking a decision as to the development of the structure. Studies pertaining to this oil field are still going on.

[11 Mar 80, p 2]

[Article: "Which Alternative Energy To Palliate the Shortage of Petroleum and Gas Production?"]

[Text] In energy matters, those who started the earliest to exploit in an extremely effective way their energy potential have passed to appropriate renewable sources and will experience the easiest transition. The countries which started later will be involved in increasingly unsolvable ecological, economic and political problems."

It was in this way that "an important figure in development" described what he calls "the decade of the eighties."

In Tunisia, where the break between production and consumption of fossil fuels (mainly petroleum and gas) is expected for 1990 in favor of consumption, have we gone (or are we on the way) to appropriate renewable sources to insure an easy transition?

Future Perspectives?

As everybody knows, it is extremely difficult to talk about the oil future of Tunisia or any other country with low discovery rates. Thus, taking into account the risky character of discoveries and the long delays needed to decide whether to put them into production, it is ex remely difficult to make forecasts.

Nevertheless, it is always possible to make some, subject obviously to a certain number of objective hypotheses. A preliminary study made by the appropriate services from the ministries of industry, mines and energy, which must be updated constantly to take into account the new data that arises, shows that, in view of the discoveries made up to now and having an opportunity to develop and exploit them, our crude oil production will be growing thin. Thus, in 1985, it will be only in the neighborhood of 5 million tons.

Always hypothesizing an absence of major discoveries, production for 1980 is estimated at less than 5 million tons. This decrease in production, together with such high demand of petroleum products as has been experienced for some years, does not give us the right to expect that we will be able to meet nationally our energy demand beyond 1990.

In addition, the petroleum and gas production statistics show an increase through 1985, followed by a decrease. Thus, for the years 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1985 and 1990, production will go successively from 4.5 million tons to 5.21, then to 5.90, 5.63 and 8.43, to decrease then to 7.03 million tons.

Consumption for these same years will ctoninue to rise, going from 3.1 million tons to 3.23, 3.79, 4.39, 7.22---then to 8.44, showing advantage in its favor for the first time and a deficit of 1.41.

This energy demand in the 1990 horizon, taking stock of existing or sure resources, should make Tunisians think about the problem of wasting energy, which is not only more and more expensive but more and more scarce.

Which Renewable Energy Should We Favor?

Faced with the progressive exhaustion of global fossil fuel reserves, mainly petroleum and natural gas, and the increase in their price, some research and studies have already been undertaken to find alternative energy sources, mainly by developed countries.

Nuclear energy is one of the main energies capable of substituting petroleum, its part of global electricity output being 6 percent, that is close to 110,000 megawatts. In 1985 this part should increase to 16 percent and

represent the equivalent of more than 400 million tons of petroleum per year, Saudi Arabia's current petroleum production. There are only two problems concerning the development of nuclear energy, the availability of uranium and ecological problems (elimination of radioactive wastes).

In Tunisia, the STEG is currently making feasibility studies for the establishment of a nuclear power plant. The decision to install such a plant has not been made since the studies are still going on.

As far as solar energy is concerned, it represents an energy of contribution and not an alternative source. Its main applications have quite specific fields: water heating in dwellings, electrification and water pumping in faraway rural areas and telecommunications.

Solar energy cannot be used in the industrial field for technical and economic reasons. The main obstacle to the development of solar energy is the very high cost of the equipment necessary to collect and use it. This makes it currently non-competitive. The sun is certainly free, solar energy is not, since the equipment needed to collect, transport and use it must be paid for.

[11 Mar 80, p 2]

[Article: "Hammam Biadha or Integral Use of Solar and Oil Energies"]

> [Text] "The solutions which will succeed are those which will be undertaken and executed locally. Some examples of how a myriad decentralized individual actions have already shown the way to follow to solve the energy problem," such is the solution proposed by a great economist and looks like the Tunisian strategy, at least in part.

In addition to the village of Hendi Zitoun, in Kairouan, where an experimental and isolated action of pumping water for irrigation using clear energy has been successfully undertaken, only the village of Hammam Biadha seems to profit from renewable energy for electricity and irrigation. In fact, the T nisian and American governments in August 1979 concluded an agreement to carry out an experimental project to use renewable energies in a village away from the electric network. The site chosen for the establishment of this project is the village of Hammam Biadha, in Siliana, delegation of Krib. The project has three parts.

First, the agricultural part. Here solar and oil energies will work together pumping water, with solar and oil pumps, for crop irrigation.

The second part, commercial and residential, will provide electric energy to light rooms, public places and stores and to operate certain machinery.

The last part, related to education, will see Tunisian engineers and technicians associated to this project and taking advantage of specialized courses on renewable energy. In addition, some students will benefit from stays of several months in the United States.

From another point of view, the cost of the project is estimated at 800,000 dinars, 600,000 of which will be paid by the American government in the form of donations.

The organizations directly responsible are the USAID for the American government and the STEG [Tunisian Gas and Electric Company] for the Tunisian Government.

Energy Conservation: An Imperative Need

This effort of searching for new energy sources must not let us lose sight of the immediate need, that is, energy conservation. Conservation of our energy resources depends to a large degree on using energy efficiently and on undertaking efforts to rationalize our energy consumption and conserve as much as possible. In the industrial sector, national companies have been instructed to watch closely their energy consumption and implement technical measures conducive to conservation: equipment maintenance, heat recovery, modification of procedures and elimination of losses.

In the transportation sector, the ministry has also created a commission to define technical and regulatory measures conducive to energy conservation: speed limits, installing tachometers on trucks, controlling carburators....

In the residential sector, citizens must learn to conserve by putting out lights that are not being used, not turning on the heat unless absolutely necessary and regulating it so that the temperature of the room is not too high . A simple act at the right moment is enough, but one must think of doing it.

An Energy Model: Until 2020

It is necessary to have an intermediate and long term energy model. The energy model is a study undertaken by a foreign consulting engineering firm with Tunisian engineers, economists and computer experts to create a computer program which, following different hypotheses for Tunisia's economic growth, will permit to forecast national energy consumption and to provide fro meeting this demand in function of the available resources: petroleum, gas, nuclear, renewable energies....

The model will, in the first place, study the current situation of Tunisia from an energy point of view, determine the main deficiencies and suggest possible remedies. In the second place, it will determine the best strategy to be adopted in matters of energy consumption, taxation of energy products and energy conservation until 2020, passing through the intermediary steps of 1985, 1990, and 1995 and 2000.

Therefore, the model will be a mathematical instrument to forecast and guide national energy policy.

PROTECTION GIVEN TO CHILDREN TO INSURE SDAR GROWTH

Paris LE MONDE in French 4 Mar 80 p 6

[Text] On 27 and 28 February the POLISARIO celebrated "somewhere in the liberated regions" the fourth anniversary of the proclamation of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (SDAR). A large military parade was the main attraction of the ceremonies which hundreds of visitors attended. Mauritania was officially represented as was Niger, although both countries have not recognized the SDAR.* Iran chose this occasion to announce the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Saharan Republic. It is the 36th country which took this step.

Since the Moroccans, like the maquisards, rule out any compromise solution at the moment, it seems that the conflict must continue. The Saharans are prepared for it. Their weak point, they know, is their number. Although they endeavor to maintain the confusion on this point by trying to give credence to figures which are obviously inflated, the number of refugees certainly does not exceed 100,000, of which a small minority comes from Mauritania, or even from Niger or Mali. This is small in relation to the 19 million Moroccans. Thus, the authorities' first concern was to ensure the survival and even the growth of the population by protecting the children to the maximum.

It would be futile to hope to have information in figures concerning this point. When we ask our escort how many children were born in the camps since the exodus, he answers "enough," a very convenient word which we hear often. When we question the director of the national hospital about the birth and mortality rates, he skillfully changes the subject.

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*Twenty African countries out of 49 have already recognized the SDAR. Observers in Algiers think that Niger, Mauritania, Nigeria and Mali could do the same in the near future. If the SDAR lacks only one recognition in order for it to form part of the OAU, Libya, which has always refrained from taking such a step, undoubtedly could no longer maintain this position.

The authorities' solicitude begins even before birth, as the director of maternity describes long clay brick buildings covered in corrugated iron which can accommodate about 100 women. The whitewashed walls are immaculate; the nurses exchanged the long Saharan over-garment for blue jeans and the standard white blouse. The person responsible for the premises, a young 24-year-old Saharan, who interrupted his studies in Spain to join the Front, tells us: "In each daira (administrative district) the medical committee takes charge of the pregnant women from the beginning of their pregnancies. They must cease all activity between the third and fourth months, a particularly delicate period, then once again beginning with the seventh month. They are then exempted from all collective tasks. They are examined in the third and sixth months, more often if necessary. They are entitled, in the area of food, to special rations supplying them with a complementary portion of proteins, vitamins and mineral salts. Finally, after delivery, they are entitled to 40 days of rest.

The maternity personnel are all Saharan, as are also the personnel at the national hospital, which is very close and which can accommodate 400 patients. It is a civil establishment reserved solely for the population from the camps. War casualties are cared for "elsewhere" with the most serious cases sent to Algerian hospitals. Training takes place on the job--we were able to attend an anatomy course given to nurses--or abroad: some medical personnel are now studying in Havana and, the hospital director tells us, "the first Saharan doctors should not be long in coming."

As seen from the women carrying children in their arms, the maternal and infant protection system is effective. The children knocking each other about, with their naked bottoms in the sand, at the entrance of the perfectly aligned tents also attest to this fact. The infants are systematically vaccinated. If it is necessary, they are taken with their mothers to small care centers where they are treated. Each camp has its own center. It simply consists of a few large military tents set up in a secluded area. The heavy khaki cloth is lined inside with a flowered cotton ton fabric and the ground is strewn with matting and multicolored rugs. "There we treat in particular intestinal irregularities, malnutrition and mild illnesses," the director of the Smara governorate care center, a former merchant whose pointed beard elongates his emaciated face even more, told us. He is assisted by a young Saharan woman who spent 2 years in a nursing school in Algiers.

Training constitutes the second concern of the POLISARIO leaders. Three national schools constructed in concrete are already in operation. The "9 June" school accommodates in its boarding school some 2000 boys and girls from 6 to 12 years old. The students, 50 per classroom and often 3 per bench, learn to read and write in Arabic with textbooks furnished by Algeria and Libya. All lessons, and especially those in history and geography, emphasize "the just fight of the Saharan people." Indoctrination is constant: it suffices for our escort to pass his head through the door of a classroom or of a dormitory and cite the first syllables of a slogan in order for several dozen voices to tirelessly repeat it.

Children over 12 years old either enter the "national school of 12 October" (national unity day), which trains political and military personnel, or are sent abroad. Thus, 2000 young people are reportedly in Libya and 500 in Algeria. Finally, another school, that of "27 February" is also a boarding school, for young girls and married women, whose children are cared for by the community. They wear the green fatigues of the soldier and take charge of their camp's protection themselves. At the end of their training, they are generally entrusted with responsibilities.

Each one of the four main camps, in addition, must be equipped, in the months to come, with a "children's palace" which will receive, starting with 3-year-olds, youngsters of any age who are not yet in school for various reasons. One of these institutions was already established in Smara governorate. It accommodates 800 day pupils.

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